Language Planning and the British Empire: Comparing Pakistan, Malaysia and Kenya

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This paper seeks to provide historical context for discussions of language planning in postcolonial societies by focusing on policies which have influenced language in three former British colonies. If we measure between the convenient markers of John Cabot’s Newfoundland expedition of 1497 and the 1997 return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty, the British Empire spanned 500 years, and at its greatest extent in the 1920s covered a fifth of the world’s land surface. Together with the economic and military emergence of the United States in the 20th century, British colonialism is widely regarded as the main reason for the global role played by English today. It is also an indispensable element of debates about imperialism in general and linguistic imperialism in particular.

Aims and Scope

To discuss postcolonial language planning it is necessary to delve into policies which had a direct influence on language during colonisation. My main aims in this paper are to review the history of language policies in three areas of the British Empire – the forerunners of modern Pakistan, Malaysia and Kenya – and to attempt to evaluate the influence of Britain’s colonial policies on current language planning, and use and perception in these former colonies. I also want to consider to what extent it is useful or even possible to isolate British colonialism as a distinct factor in the globalisation of English. I have included economic, political and demographic summaries since I feel these areas have had almost as much influence on language as educational and administrative policies.

By focusing on three countries I have tried to strike a balance between detailed monographs and a broad sweep of the whole empire. In the course of examining British economic, military and political encroachments into Northern India, Malaya and East Africa, I have also made reference to what are now Bangladesh, Singapore and Tanzania, and above all to India, whose governance had a seminal effect on the empire.

I don’t claim that the histories of Pakistan, Malaysia and Kenya yield deeper insight into colonial and postcolonial language planning than those of any other former British colony, but their stories are fascinating, and they were not chosen arbitrarily. Each country had a long British presence and achieved a negotiated but by no means non-violent independence in the two decades after the Second World War, in contrast to the more heavily European-settled territories which gained self-government early in the last century, or smaller outposts that retained their dependent status longer. Moreover, down to the Second World
War British territories bordering the Indian Ocean were subject to relatively little American influence, in contrast to those around the Atlantic and Pacific.

While being intensely multilingual, all three have undergone a considerable degree of linguistic rationalisation since decolonisation, based around English and one national language that also carries regional weight. Each is an active arena of discussion about the role of other locally used languages, whose combined native speakers constitute large majorities in Kenya and Pakistan and a large and influential minority in Malaysia. Another point in common is Islam – a major religion in Kenya, the majority faith in Malaysia, and the cornerstone of Pakistan. Possessing long-standing links with all three national languages, Islam often provides a counterweight to the cultural imperatives of the colonial language. All these similarities should not be overplayed, however, since the economic disparity between Malaysia and the other two has a crucial bearing on their respective language planning choices.

The historical scope is from the late 18th century to the late 20th century – that is, from the ‘second empire’ carved out after the loss of the American colonies, down to the ‘second colonial occupation’ following the Second World War, and on into the decades of decolonisation, a process which could be said to be continuing today.

**Approach and Methods**

I have approached this topic from the perspective of economic and political history rather than linguistics. By this I mean that while I accept that language has a capacity to shape social action as well as be shaped by it, I am most interested here in the role of language as a function and consequence of socio-economic and political imperatives. I see more evidence of economics and politics delimiting language choice than of language choice determining economic and political options.

As for colonialism and its responses, despite holding reservations about theories which explain away imperialism as a later stage in the development of capitalism, I do see economic interests, underpinned by military power, as paramount. The Orientalist intellectual curiosity of the 18th century, the civilising and evangelising rhetoric of the 19th, and the social imperialist theories of the 20th may have been genuinely expressed and received in many quarters of Britain and the empire, but they were rarely allowed to pull against the economic reins of the metropolitan elite. On the other side, nationalism undoubtedly included rich and varied cultures of resistance to racially based oppression, but as the histories of the three polities in question show, it evolved in ways which were useful to the most economically viable elites while accommodating the key longer-term interests of the colonial power.

Although some use has been made of legal enactments, official publications, press reports and personal interviews, there has not been time or space for much primary enquiry. Most of this paper rests on a juxtaposition of reported linguistic and educational data with historical and political commentaries. Moreover, aside from a little material in Malay and a handful of writing in languages bearing their own colonial baggage, such as French and Japanese, all the sources are in English. While this essentially reflects my personal limitations it is also an iron-
ical reflection of the current dominance of the imperial language par excellence on all sides of the global language planning debate. One more shortcoming is that a lot of the history cited here was written in order to analyse the outlook of the colonisers rather than the colonised. It would be enriched by the responses of those with access to different languages and different viewpoints.

Outline

The following eight sections proceed roughly from a colonial to a postcolonial perspective. The paper starts with the economic, cultural and social background of the colonisers. The general focus is on the colonisers as agents of change and the colonised as recipients, mediators and opponents, although I also argue that the colonial dynamic was multidirectional. I have begun with a leading paradigm from economic history which sees ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ – the interests of a small but hegemonic class of English financiers – as the main driving force behind British empire-building almost until its last days. I then look at the intellectual culture of this class and the social mechanisms through which its influence was disseminated throughout the complex structures of colonial administration. My view is that there was little systematised, central planning behind British colonialism, and yet there were striking similarities across far-flung administrations because of the common socioeconomic outlook of the colonial class, which emphasised commercial over industrial interests, local over central funding, and selective collaboration with traditional elites over wholesale innovation.

In the following section, economic and political motives for colonial intervention in Indo-Pakistan, Malaya and Kenya are outlined, and the third section deals in some detail with colonial administrative and educational practices that had direct bearing on language use. I have tried to show that the tendency was to restrict rather than promote English, although this divide-and-rule strategy was not applied dogmatically but according to local commercial and security needs, thus allowing support for regional linguae francae such as Hindustani, Malay and Kiswahili where these were considered useful tools of colonialism.

The fourth section continues the discussion through decolonisation into the postcolonial era, arguing that it was only when the possibility of losing the empire looked real that British bureaucrats and politicians and their colonised allies contemplated systematic cultural intrusion. Pakistan was out of the empire before policies to spread English were fully in fashion, while Malaysia achieved statehood in the middle of a debate about whether to promote English or Malay. In Kenya an educational policy in favour of English was in place before independence and has not been radically amended since. Despite these differences, stemming from the timetable of decolonisation, English emerged as the servant of the national elites in all three polities, and not as an instrument of the masses. Any changes in its role since then owe more to global economic and technological factors than to the colonial legacy.

The fifth section goes more specifically into the linguistic investments that have been made in key postcolonial institutions such as the bureaucracy and judiciary. The section following then widens the geographical focus to the status and use of English in the Commonwealth, the current successor to the British
Empire. The data suggest that even today the former colonial language is concentrated in the centres of power and peters out towards the edges. In the penultimate section I summarise several ongoing debates about the role language plays in the development of postcolonial nations, and in the final section I conclude with an attempt to identify what was distinctive about the language-influencing policies of the British Empire, and how much credence should be given to their continued existence in a postcolonial afterlife.

The Economic, Cultural and Social Underpinnings of British Colonialism

Colonial focus

The experience of colonialism is one of the most important constraints on postcolonial language planning. This paper focuses heavily on educational and administrative policies in the British Empire and also on socioeconomic practices that had a direct impact on language. In my view the search for economic profit was always the key spice in the British imperial blend, and to emphasise this I have drawn on the work of British economic historians in the following subsections, while adding commentary from intellectual history and details about the sociology of the colonial services in order to estimate the disposition of colonial officers towards language-related policies.

Gentlemanly capitalism

Cain and Hopkins (1993) have identified a core theme running through British colonialism, at least from the 1680s to the 1940s: the dominant role played by ‘gentlemanly capitalists’, who hitched the social and political survival of the traditional landed classes to the financial and commercial vehicles of overseas expansion. The Glorious Revolution of 1688 sealed an enduring pact between the English landed interests who dominated parliament and the London-based commercial classes who could supply them with capital. This alliance colonised government policy-making and promoted a mercantilist system which sheltered agriculture while diverting investment overseas. In the first half of the 19th century, when British society was faced with great upheaval after decades of frenetic industrialisation, the propertied class was saved from becoming ‘divided against itself’ by the aristocracy grudgingly conceding a series of electoral and economic reforms. They also strengthened their financial standing by allowing marriage-ties with merchant and banking families, while the latter thereby acquired heightened social status and ‘gentlemanly values’. The result was a class ideology that legitimated moneymaking through invisible financial services while disdaining manufacturing. The public (i.e. elitist private) schools supplied a grounding in Greek and Latin, and frequent reference to ancient virtue and hubris can be found in the writings of colonial officers, such as Halhed’s analogies between the Romans’ study of the Greeks they had conquered and the British interest in Indian classics (Cohn, 1996). Public school also inculcated individualism and adventurism, opportunities for which expanded as London financial houses took over world trade, investment, and insurance systems.
Thus during colonial expansion, finance took precedence over domestic industrial production. Britain may have been the workshop of the world – providing 20% of the globe’s manufactures in 1869 (Reynolds, 1991) – but colonialism was driven by something much more tactical and sectarian than the search for raw materials and markets that traditional Marxist interpretations have focused on. As Cook (1996) has noted, industry had little relevance to British policy in Africa before 1914. The needs of the industrialists did coincide with those of the gentleman-capitalists often enough to placate them (Cain & Hopkins, 1993), but when they did not it was the latter who prevailed. This assertion is supported by an established view among British economic historians that capital needed by industry at home tended instead to go abroad in search of higher profits.

Cain and Hopkins (1993) further claim that the acquisition of naval bases and territories was done primarily to protect these profits, rather than to serve national aggrandisement. Although support for nationalistic imperialism did grow later in the 19th century, gentlemanly capitalism continued to dominate the domestic and overseas civil services. Thus there was a general reluctance to intervene in foreign social and political systems, let alone to replace them with new ones, as long as the prevailing world order – the Pax Britannica – upheld the hegemony of London’s banking and insurance houses. As Reynolds puts it:

> Despite early Victorian waves of evangelical and reforming zeal, the prime objective of British rule was not to Anglicise or even ‘improve’ India. As elsewhere in the Empire, Indians were left to their own religious, social and economic devices, except where order was threatened or British interests jeopardised. (Reynolds, 1991: 27)

So we should not be surprised to find relatively little overt language or cultural planning. It has often been argued that imperial policy did become more dirigiste in its later years, in response to an overwhelming sense of national decline. However, Cain and Hopkins, and Reynolds, concur that Britain’s slow-down has been exaggerated. Reynolds (1991) argues that it was inevitable the rest of the world make inroads into Britain’s unprecedented lead. Moreover, falling productivity in manufacturing was offset by the efficiency of agriculture and the service sectors. In any case, if Cain and Hopkins’ views are accepted, it was the still-booming financial houses, and not industrialism in a crisis, which fuelled the later and most rapid colonial expansions. The same insistence on free trade and financial conservatism remained paramount even after the First World War. Only in the crisis following the Second World War did Britain take a more comprehensive, interventionist approach to the colonies, and even then it was the financial interests of the gentleman-capitalists which were of prime concern.

Bowen (1996) and Clayton (2000) have criticised certain details of the gentlemanly capitalism theory on economic grounds. It might also be argued that giving such weight to London financiers and their colonisation of government policy-making underestimates the importance of actors in the colonies themselves. Nevertheless the general view that the British colonial class combined administrative pragmatism with cultural conservatism is supported by intellectual history.
British intellectual culture, anthropology, and colonialism

Edward Said’s work, especially his 1978 attack on Orientalism, reminds us that military, political and economic power always has an important cultural dimension. His theories have helped to focus much of the debate about culture on the problem of representation. How can we represent cultures other than our own? How can the disempowered make their voice heard in discussions whose agenda is not of their own making? He contends that the colonised are forced into passivity by being systematically represented as other. Turning to the linguistic aspect of culture, we can see power wielded through practices such as monopolistic interpretations of words and selections of discourse. Fairclough (1989), for instance, argues that while there is a danger in focusing on language to the neglect of other social processes, ideologically bound discourse is the prime means of manufacturing consent to inequality. This view from sociolinguistics parallels Said’s (1993) emphasis of cultural hegemony over military coercion, in support of which he mentions the mere 60,000 British troops on hand in the 1930s to deal with over 300 million Indians.8

To what extent was the use and restriction of language itself a tool of colonial power? While it is one thing to assert that the British used culture to reinforce their empire, it is quite another to demonstrate its role in the dynamics of power, let alone to measure it.

Because I feel economics to have been the dominant imperative, in this paper I am concentrating more on the significance of culture, and especially language, as a product of colonial expansion, and less so on linguistic contributions to that expansion. I hope to show that British society throughout most of the colonial period was so politically elitist and socially stable that the dominant metropolitan cultural and social theories of the day must also have held sway over the gentleman-capitalists in the colonies.9 Despite florid rhetoric in support of English or local languages (both classical and vernacular), there was no cultural or ideological stance as strong as the pragmatic interest of the colonial classes in using whatever linguistic means they thought would best preserve social stability while affording economic exploitation.

In response to the intellectual upheavals in Europe at the end of the 1960s, Perry Anderson wrote a summary of British – or rather, English – intellectual history that has not been convincingly refuted. His focus is on the culture of the elite, i.e. the complex of original thought produced by the 19th and 20th century intelligentsia, and particularly on social sciences such as anthropology, political theory, sociology and literary criticism, since he sees these as having had a more direct impact on social structure than the natural sciences or the arts (P. Anderson, 1968). While the emphasis is on metropolitan culture, three of his conclusions shed some light on the social outlook of the class running the empire.

Firstly, Victorian imperialism was a parochial affair in which ‘the harmony between the hegemonic classes and its intellectuals was virtually complete’ (P. Anderson, 1968: 59). In contrast to the rest of Europe, the intelligentsia were conformists. Indeed, not only did they have the same social outlook as the politicians and the bankers, but they were related to them by kinship. It is primarily for this reason I feel able to presume that the prevailing metropolitan ideology was
also the ideology of the colonial administrators. In any case, there was not much of a counter-ideology. Secondly, although essentially traditionalist, with a hostility toward abstract ideas going back to Burke’s critique of the French Revolution, the stability of metropolitan society and the position of the empire seemed so unshakeable that ‘there was ample elbow-room for experiment without danger that the main fabric of our economic well-being would be destroyed’ (P. Anderson, 1968: 60). This cultural confidence, I feel, enabled the colonisers to be pragmatic rather than dogmatic, and to go along with local conditions as long as they did not threaten the survival of Britain’s (primarily economic) interests. They had an inbred tendency to reject systematic theories, and to tolerate administrative disorder while nonetheless fearing social upheaval. There was also a predilection for dealing with individuals and elites rather than addressing mass movements.

Thirdly, Britain was alone among large Western societies in failing to produce a body of sociology to rank with Durkheim, Pareto, Weber or Marx. Yet this same society produced a ‘brilliant and flourishing anthropology’ (P. Anderson, 1968: 92) through which Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown, Evans-Pritchard, Forbes and Leach won international repute. The contrast can be accounted for largely by that discipline’s focus on foreign and exotic societies and its theoretical assumptions of social stability. British culture was not interested in developing a theory of its own structure or to contemplate the possibility of radical internal change. But through anthropology

British imperial society *exported* its totalisations onto its subject peoples. There, and there only, it could afford scientific study of the social whole. ‘Primitive’ societies became the surrogate object of the theory proscribed at home. British anthropology developed unabashedly in the wake of British imperialism. Colonial administration had an inherent need of cogent, objective information about the people over which they ruled (P. Anderson, 1968: 93).

Said also sees a symbiosis between anthropology and colonialism in the French empire (e.g. Said, 1993), but Anderson’s point is not that anthropology was so ‘British’ but that its systematising vigour and divorce from sociology were especially significant in Britain. Intellectuals, though by no means politically conservative, studied ‘primitive’ communities as ahistorical, bounded groups and showed little interest in the processes of long-term conflict and change. An added dimension was their focus on the elites they needed to stay on good terms with in order to gain access to their subjects. Language difficulties also tended to mean they overemphasised the importance of the powerful few who were deemed able to translate for them. Thus the intellectual imperative can be argued to have been quite compatible with socially conservative colonialism.

**The Orientalist tradition**

Said’s is probably the most influential voice among those who argue that culture and language were central to all European colonialism. But his work is vague about the nature of power, describing a ‘flexible positional superiority which puts the Westerner in a whole series of possible relationships with the
Orient without ever losing him his upper hand’ (Said, 1978: 2). He has also been accused of extreme selectivity of data – most scathingly by Lewis (1993). Rahman (1996) diminishes Said’s impact in succinctly pointing out that ‘othering’ is inherent in the discourse produced by any collectivity about another. Nevertheless Said’s work has brought culture to the forefront of discussions on imperialism, in addition to charging all subsequent scholarship supported by the superior material resources of the West with a commensurate responsibility to question its own ideological assumptions.

Some have seen the power struggle in early 19th-century India between Orientalists in favour of classical learning or vernacular education and the pro-English Anglicists as a seminal phase of British colonialism. Others – for example, Pennycook (1994) – have argued that the disputants merely represented two sides of the same colonial coin. Either way, the debate was not decisive because it was never really resolved, and in any case it was much more than a tussle for and against English, exposing different views on whether global commercial networks could be administered without deliberate and systematic intervention in the lives of local inhabitants. The linguistic aspect of debate was mostly confined to the degree to which English should be disseminated within a relatively small section of the colonised population.

Rahman (1996) concludes that the Orientalists were better informed than the Anglicists about local conditions and history, and less disruptive of traditions. Persian grammarian William Jones may have been patronising in believing that the Indians deserved the blessings of British rule, but he also had genuine respect for their classical learning. Early on there seems to have been appreciation for British Islamic scholarship, such as Sale’s translation of the Qur’an, from the Mughals themselves, even though plans to establish a chair in Persian at Oxford were thwarted by East India Company (EIC) preferences for more commercially lucrative projects (Khan, 1998). Cook (1996) argues that association and acquaintance with India’s fabled past was a source of pride for the colonialists. Nevertheless Rahman comes close to Pennycook’s cynicism in exposing the political agenda of Orientalist Governor-Generals such as Hastings and Wellesley who saw support for local languages as a way of ingratiating themselves with the Indians (Rahman, 1996). Meanwhile Anglicists anchored their belief in the superiority of English civilisation with a similar sense of pragmatism: evangelist EIC Director Charles Grant considered that the social instability that might result from a Western education could be neutralised by inculcating a love for the language and literature of the colonial power (Rahman, 1996) – although Joshi’s (1998) research shows how adept educated Indians became at consuming English novels while resisting British culture.

If the Orientalists have been accused of fostering a romantic image of a mature yet inherently irrational East, Anglicism was guilty of attachment to the superiority of Western reasoning. Goody’s research into the development of logical reasoning in different civilisations (Goody, 1996) finds rationality to be an attribute of all societies, but he concedes that the historically unprecedented spread of writing in post-Renaissance Europe did lead to a multiplication of particular kinds of sequential reasoning which accelerated the accumulation of knowledge and helps to explain scientific and commercial development. If the scholastic and material advances of the West can be connected with culturally specific intellec-
tual developments, this raises the large question of whether new technologies can be applied without adopting the cultural practices of the society they originally evolved in. This has great relevance to language planning issues not only because of the various academic positions taken on the Whorf-Sapir thesis about the relation between thought and language, but because of the practical tasks of developing the corpus of a language so that it can be a suitable vehicle for ‘modernisation’.

Under British colonialism, however, the central aim seems to have been to secure the benefits of economic innovation for the colonial power while minimising its social impact on the locals, and this seems to have been attempted through both colonial and local language. Against Ngugi wa Thiong’o (1997: 28) describing pre-English Kenyan education as ‘the first fortress to be stormed by the spiritual army of colonialism, clearing and guarding the way for a permanent siege . . .’ we can also cite Memmi’s ironical comment on the pedantic and stifling nature of (French) Oriental scholarship: ‘If only the mother tongue were allowed to have some influence on current social life’ (Memmi, 1957: 172).

Ideology and cultural policy

Homi Bhaba (1994) has argued that Macaulay’s 1835 Minute on Education, which was contemptuous of oriental learning (see third section), actually exposed the racist (it could also be argued, parochial) nature of British civilisation by offering the Indians no better prospects for liberation from their ignorance than acquaintance with a few morsels of literature that would turn them into pale copies of Englishmen. This view of the narrow and tribalist nature of British culture is echoed by Richard Waswo (The Founding of Western Civilisation, 1997 – cited by Keith Windshuttle, 1998) who argues that a rationale in support of colonialism can be found running right through English literature, from Spenser down to Conrad and Forster. Ngugi (1997) identifies several different forms of racism across the literary canon, from Trollope’s dismissal of the ‘idle, unambitious’ African to Conrad’s contempt for coloniser and colonised alike. In contrast, Windshuttle (1998) rallies to the defence of pluralist and pragmatic English critical thought, imbued with the history of Ancient Rome and its lessons about the folly of engaging in military expansion without obvious commercial gain.

In fact it is difficult to find much ideological content in the British colonial project unless it is the general assumption that the empire should stand or fall according to economic criteria. Even its critics tended to baulk from condemnation on moral grounds. Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776) argued for peaceable overseas relations rather than gunboat diplomacy in the cause of efficient free trade (Windshuttle, 1998), while Hobson’s powerful 1902 attack on imperialism (Imperialism: A Study) was based not on its racism but on the harm it did the British working class (Hargreaves, 1996). Cook (1996) concludes that anti-imperialism was at its most influential when self-interest could be bonded to idealism, as in the campaign in Britain against Belgian atrocities in the Congo. Another example might be the conveniently anti-French tone of the early anti-slavery movement. William Morris and Mary Kingsley were more ethically motivated and informed critics of empire in the late 1800s, and Kirk-Greene (1999) gives us evidence that by the early 20th century there was a certain amount of disaffection in the ranks of the colonial services themselves: both Leonard Woolf and George
Orwell brought back negative impressions of their postings in South Asia which influenced their writing. However, Said dismisses the influence of principled anti-colonialism as negligible. The pomp surrounding Disraeli’s Empress of India Bill indicates a degree of ideological underpinning on the other side by the 1870s. Yet its thoroughly pragmatic economic and party political subtext should not be overlooked.

Perhaps we can conclude that there was little need to develop an overarching ideology for the empire because until the very last days there was little idea of its disappearing. However, that is not to say that the only concept of cultural policy was *laissez-faire*. As the wealthiest and most technologically advanced power of the colonial era – attaining by 1840 a per capital income of $550 (Reynolds, 1991) that modern Pakistan and Kenya have yet to reach – Britain was uniquely equipped to construct a large-scale imagined community.\(^1\) Pennycook (1994) claims that the Victorian era was marked by ‘the wholesale invention of traditions. With Britain going through massive social upheavals as it became increasingly industrialised and the pre-eminent global power through its colonial activities, there were numerous attempts to establish continuity with a suitable historic past, an attempt to structure some parts of life as unchanging and invariant’.

In linguistics, for example, we can see a greater focus on the history of the English language rather than the comparative philology more typical of the European continent. There is evidence from the beginning of the 19th century of an elevation in the status of the language. Pennycook (1994) offers us the example of E. Guest (1838: *A History of English Rhythms*), who believed English to be the language ‘bearing most directly on the happiness of mankind’. Consider also Reverend J. George (*The Mission of Great Britain to the World*, 1867), who predicted English would become ‘a universal language for the great material and spiritual interests of mankind’ (Pennycook, 1994: 115). In education there was the gradual development of a literary canon for the masses. However, government was rarely eager to intervene in civil society. As Inspector of Schools, Matthew Arnold (1867) campaigned vigorously but with limited success for the dissemination of high culture to the masses as a corrective to the materialism and cynicism of a nation obsessed with commerce.

If cultural policy was limited or vague at home, it might be concluded that language and educational policy must have been similarly diffuse in the colonies. And yet there is evidence to suggest that certain unities were developed to transcend the dispersed, fragmented nature of the empire. Singaporean writer Edwin Thumboo, for example, at a 1960s Commonwealth literature conference discovered he shared a store of literary and cultural allusion with participants from around the globe (Pennycook, 1994). Viswanathan (1989) has argued that the development of a national corpus of English literature was underway in the elite English-medium schools of the colonies when literary study back in Britain still confined itself to Greek and Latin. The process was initiated in India as part of a strategy to gain acceptance for colonial rule. She claims that literature and history were surrogates for the moralising values of religion which colonial administrators were unwilling to impose on Hindus and Muslims directly. Only later did the literary canon find itself on the timetable of nascent mass education in Britain once its socialising uses had been fully appreciated. But if there were
such wholesale export and re-import of culture, as this implies, in the colonies it involved only the elites, at least until the latter stages of colonialism.

The colonial services

We cannot speculate on the nature of British colonial language and educational policies without considering the kind of people who were implementing it. Cain (1993: 12) has described the empire as an ‘enormous arena . . . for the export of British talent’. These gentleman-capitalists didn’t know much about industry, he adds, so they left it alone. And they didn’t know much about commerce except for the City and its focus on the export of capital. Yet they were successful for a long time because they came from a successful social alliance and because of their confidence, at least until the last decades of empire, in free trade economics and laissez-faire administration.

Whether it was the East India Company in the 17th century, or MacKinnon’s British East Africa Association in the 1880s, the typical pattern of colonial expansion was of private commercial initiative gradually and often reluctantly being taken over by government while continuing to provide local expertise. A vital link between government and private enterprise came from the principle of financing colonial development locally, which can be traced as far back as Treasury Secretary Sir George Downing (1623–84). This meant that local colonial officers were often forced to collaborate with private enterprise to fund the costs of administration.

The most striking thing about the institutions running what became a vast empire was the piecemeal fashion in which they came into being. As Kirk-Greene puts it, ‘Britain’s colonial empire had no rationalisation and little coherence in its growth’ (Kirk-Greene, 1999: 6). When a new territory was recognised as being under British administration, the Crown would appoint a governor, who then had to put together an administration from locally hired staff. In the American colonies this was easily done, but when they were lost Britain found most of its remaining possessions were in tropical zones to which it was not easy to attract European settlers. Without a local reserve of British nationals to rely on, it was necessary to start recruiting civil servants to go out to far-flung territories. As late as 1927 the Secretary of State for the Colonies declared:

> Strictly speaking there is, of course, no Colonial Empire and no such thing as a Colonial Service . . . I deal in this office with some twenty six different governments, each entirely separate from the rest, each administratively, financially, legislatively self-contained (Kirk-Greene, 1999: 13).

According to Reynolds (1991), differences not only between London and the colonies, but between and within the executive and legislative branches of government, persisted even after the Second World War. While bureaucratic rivalry and lack of coordination were not unique to Britain, they were uniquely entrenched because of the influence and stability of the career civil service (Reynolds, 1991). With minimal interference from government or party politics, old boy networks dominated an ethos of ‘continuity and compromise and muddle’. To ‘talk of “policymaking”, even for individual departments, conveys an exaggerated image of rationality, order and effectiveness’ (Reynolds, 1991: 57).
There is, however, a way of making some sense of all of this, and that is to look at the recruitment procedures of the colonial services and the social and educational background of the civil servants themselves. Until the mid-1800s entry was by patronage and personal connection, and this remained the main method of appointing governors into the modern era. But led by the colonial services for the East in 1867, there was a steady introduction of recruitment by competitive examination, and by 1896 the Eastern, Indian and Home Civil Services were setting common exams. The other colonial services seem to have shunned formal tests, however, preferring to rely on interview. Kirk-Greene (1999) feels that this method nevertheless managed to attract a high calibre of recruit. Mid-century reforms at Oxford and Cambridge meant that merit started to play a role alongside connection in the English universities (as it had long done in Scotland), and Oxbridge soon became the most important recruiting ground.

Cain and Hopkins argue that the various colonial services provided an ideal career for products of the public schools where a disdain for industry was bred. They calculate that in the 1880s only 25% of boys at Rugby, and a mere 17% of those at Harrow, went on to lives as businessmen (Cain & Hopkins, 1993). The acceptable alternatives were the invisible financial services of the City, and government service. In their estimation 75% of the Indian Civil Service had been through Oxbridge, and nearly all the rest were from similar professional upper and middle class backgrounds. The African civil services, which evolved somewhat later, tended to be filled by the new urban gentry of the London area, with similar educations taking in also the newer universities, and similar but perhaps more varied and mobile social backgrounds. Civil service posts were well remunerated – the highest paid bureaucratic jobs of their day (Cook, 1996) – and so gradually attracted well-educated people from less affluent families. But they rarely seem to have drawn on the ranks of industry. And there was no Treasury support for a truly professional corps of centrally recruited officials until the last days of the empire. Once again, it can only be concluded that pragmatism and conservatism were the main traits of the policy-makers.

Economic and Political Incursions into India, Malaya and East Africa

Economic and political incursions into India

A general outline of Britain’s intervention in India is crucial to an understanding of British influence not only in the region of Pakistan but beyond it in Malaya and indeed the rest of the empire. After Britain conceded the loss of the American colonies in 1782, Anglo-French rivalry for global dominance became most intense in the Indian theatres of war and commerce, and Britain’s success in that conflict brought a ‘second empire’ and a new culture of confidence which included the emergence of the English language from under the academic and literary shadows of Greek, Latin and French. Many administrative and social practices and hence language policies pioneered in India came to characterise British colonialism elsewhere. A case might therefore be made for relating the expansion of the English language directly to British territorial acquisitions. However, a closer inspection of the second empire, and particularly of its evolution in India, suggests the relationship was anything but direct.
Although the British Empire was built upon the profits and networks of localised commercial projects, relations between the merchants and the administrators were often strained. The story of the East India Company established a pattern to be repeated many times. According to Keay its ‘incorrigible pioneering’ gave the Empire a ‘peculiarly diffuse character’ (Keay, 1993: xx). When the EIC was established in 1600, Portugal was the dominant but declining European power in Asia. Portuguese had long been a major lingua franca along the trading routes (Groeneboer, 1998). The Mughal emperor Akbar (1556–1605) commissioned ‘Abd al-Sattar to learn first Portuguese and then other European languages in order to translate Western texts. However, the Portuguese seem to have made themselves unpopular because of their tight control of the shipping routes to Mecca and jealous attempts to convert Muslims and Hindus to Catholicism.

Ability to use the languages of the region was an invaluable asset among the first employees of the EIC. Despite a mixed reputation for diplomacy, William Hawkins was dispatched in 1608 to make overtures to the Persian-speaking court of Jehangir (1605–27) because of his knowledge of Turkish, an important link language. This ushered in James I’s appointment of Thomas Roe as ambassador to the Mughal court and permission for British companies to trade and build factories. Roe’s efforts to gain protection and legitimacy from the Mughal court were plagued by a lack of reliable interpreters, and he often had to resort to a chain of Spanish, Italian and Turkish-speaking intermediaries (Cohn, 1996). A complex intertwining of private commercial initiative and state political manoeuvring developed early on, but compared with the Dutch government-backed VOC, the EIC was on its own. Diplomatic skills and a taste for political intrigue seem to have helped it make free trade work to its advantage. In contrast, the Compagnie Française des Indes Orientales was always tied more closely to French national prestige, a political burden which also became a financial one since its state-linked backers lacked flexibility and avoided financial risk.

British victories at Plassey (1757) and Pondichery (1761) effectively removed the French as colonial competitors. As well as changing the balance of power among the European powers, these conflicts demonstrated Western military and technological superiority over the East – often to the surprise of the Europeans as much as the Indians. Although this period saw the end of Mughal power, it did not end a British propensity to invoke Mughal authority to legitimate its presence. The freedom of a private company to make war inevitably led to concern in London. The 1773 Regulating Act placed the administration of all the EIC’s Indian possessions under a Crown-appointed Governor-General of Bengal and a London-based Board of six Commissioners. The first Governor-General was Warren Hastings. Described as a man who dreamed not of the British, but of the Moghul Empire, Hastings steadfastly sought to master local systems of knowledge, although it is debatable whether this was primarily for personal interest or administrative efficiency. Pitt’s 1785 India Act further extended government supervision of the company’s activities by establishing a Board of Control, while in 1813 the Indian markets were opened up to any British trader. The EIC’s identity as a private company was lost long before its dissolution after the anti-British uprising of 1857.
Under Governor Wellesley (1798–1805) operations became more political and military. While smaller Indian states were annexed outright, alliances were imposed on the stronger states whereby the rulers accepted British control of external affairs and the ‘advice’ of a Resident but continued to manage internal matters. In this way the costs of administering India were passed on to the Indians themselves. Whereas opposition to the British occupation seemed only natural to historians taking the Indian part, contemporary British historians made much of bureaucratic insensitivity to religious differences in the Indian armed forces in an attempt to explain distaste for British rule. Racially based pay differentials in the army, overzealous proselytising on the part of missionaries, and allowing Christian converts to inherit property were all made scapegoats (Cohn, 1996). The general consequence of the war was an attempt to slow down social change. A specific consequence was a tendency to distrust Muslims more than Hindus.

Economic and political incursions into Malaya

The EIC was also involved in the colonisation of Malaya. Again there was a pattern of Portuguese hegemony (it is estimated that there are still 1000 speakers of the Malay–Portuguese Creole *Papia Kristang* in Malacca) giving way to Dutch and finally British influence. In 1786 the company founded a trading settlement in Penang, and British occupation of the island was recognised by the sultan of Kedah in 1791. In 1819 Thomas Stamford Raffles (1781–1826) purchased Singapore from ancestors of the sultans of Johor on behalf of the company. The transfer was finally conceded by the Dutch in 1824 with a treaty which divided Malaya and the East Indies into separate zones of British and Dutch influence. In 1826 Penang, Singapore and Malacca were combined as the Straits Settlements.

The Indian practice of dual administration was extended to Malaya. Under the 1874 Pangkor Treaty a British Resident was installed in Perak, ostensibly to advise the sultanate on unrest among Chinese workers in the tin industry. Pennycook (1994) has suggested the real motive was to enhance British commercial interests at a time when national supremacy felt less secure because of competition from Germany and America. Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang were treated collectively as the Federated Malay States from 1896. In 1909 the British usurped Siamese rule over the northern Malay states of Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis and Terengganu and extended the system of Residents and Advisers there too. Together with Johor these were administered as the Unfederated Malay States.

Chinese communities were well-established in both Malaya and Borneo long before the British arrived (Nomura, 1989), but the 20th century brought a huge increase in the form of recruitment into the tin industry through collaboration between secret societies and mine-owners. The slump in the Western economies after the First World War acted as a brake on production of raw materials – and also recruitment into the colonial civil services – but as Godemont (1997) points out, it coincided with a boom in the Chinese, Japanese and Indian economies. Instead of tailing off with tin production, Chinese settlement diversified into other businesses and became more settled and family-based. The colonial authorities also encouraged Indian immigration for the rubber and palm oil industries. By 1930 Malays made up only 40% of the population, alongside 40% Chinese and
20% Indians (Godemont, 1997). British economic and demographic policies were thus important factors in linguistic patterns, regardless of policies specifically related to language use.

British colonisation of East Malaysia was even more overtly commercial. While British interests were usurping the Dutch in the northern part of Borneo, James Brooke (1803–68), who had served with the EIC’s military wing in Burma, helped crush an Iban rebellion in 1841, and was rewarded by the sultan of Brunei with the title Rajah and tracts of land around the Sarawak River. He and his descendants proceeded to rule Sarawak as a family fiefdom for the next century through a combination of paternalism towards the indigenous communities, and military encroachment upon Brunei’s territories. James’ successor, Charles (1829–1917) studied Iban language and customs and made extensive use of indigenous officers in civil and military administration. A certain amount of Chinese immigration was supported in order to develop agriculture, but in general local traditions were to be protected against social change, paralleling administrative patterns in Malaya. The third and final White Rajah, Vyner Brooke (1874–1963), embarked on a more comprehensive programme of economic and educational development and was planning a transfer of government into local hands on the eve of the Japanese occupation of 1941. Control over the indigenous groups of Sabah and its long-established Chinese minorities came through steady exploitation of a power vacuum, with the British leasing land from the nominal rulers, the Sulu sultanate, to build a trading settlement in Sandakan in 1872. This became the base for the British North Borneo Company, which administered a protectorate from 1881 until the Japanese occupation, suppressing a rebellion led by the Muslim chief Mat Salleh between 1895 and 1900.

To some extent Japanese occupation worked to restore the position of the Malays in Malaya. As early as 1938 the Young Malay Union in the East Indies campaigned for Japan to rid Asia of European colonialism (Godemont, 1997), and after the Japanese invasions of 1941 there was increased support for Melayu Raya – a union of the Malay-speaking peoples on both sides of the Straits of Malacca under Japanese tutelage (Asmah, 1979). The Japanese authorities mobilised Malays, including women (Godemont, 1997) in ways undreamt of by the British, appointing them to District Officer posts (Kratoska, 1998). Meanwhile there was an inherent hostility between the Japanese imperial troops, many of them freshly arrived from combat in Southern China (Godemont, 1997) and the Chinese in Malaya, whether they were Guomindang or communist sympathisers. But Japanese popularity was superficial and constrained by exploitation of the economy for Japanese military needs. Instructions that troops respect local customs were transparently issued for reasons of military efficacy (Kratoska, 1998).

**Economic and political incursions into East Africa**

As in India and Malaya, the Portuguese preceded the British in Kenya, establishing an alliance with Malindi and taking control of the other main coastal cities in the 16th century against the opposition of Arab traders. Despite losing Fort Jesus to the Muscat-based Omanis in 1698, the Portuguese remained active around the coast for another century. Portuguese seems to have been an important lingua franca, and has contributed at least a hundred words to the Swahili
language. In 1824 the British established a temporary base in Mombassa in response to a call for help from the Mazruis against the Omanis, but there was no wish to antagonise the latter since the principle British concern at this time was to protect the sea routes to India. Neither the Europeans nor the Omanis took much interest in the interior, although there are records of Swahili expeditions in search of ivory and slaves which met resistance from the cattle-herding Maasai.

European commercial activity was largely confined to the coast until well into the 19th century. After agreeing to recognise a 10-mile-wide coastal strip as under the jurisdiction of the sultanate of Zanzibar in 1886, Britain and Germany divided their interest in the hinterland along a line corresponding to the present border between Kenya and Tanzania. MacKinnon’s British East Africa Association was granted a concession in perpetuity to develop land in the interior. Potential disputes with other European powers having been minimised by the Congress of Berlin, the British government showed its traditional preference for letting private initiative bear the burden of commercial development. In 1888 Mackinnon’s Association became the Imperial British East Africa Company under a charter which authorised commercial activity inland. However, when the company became embroiled in a costly civil war in Buganda in the 1890s, the government was forced to intervene, setting up the East African Protectorate in 1895.

Cain and Hopkins (1993) argue that Britain’s imperial aims were at their most transparent in directly governed protectorates, and therefore see the relative lack of political or industrial pressure to develop Kenya as strong evidence of a fragmented gentleman-capitalist empire. There were few valuable minerals or obvious commercial opportunities to attract investors, and the well-established principle of local self-sufficiency in the colonies meant that those running the new Protectorate had to be resourceful. One idea was to intervene economically but not socially, but Robinson (1979) describes this concept of guardianship as ‘remarkably inconsistent with practice’. Ochieng’ and Atieno-Odhihambo (1995) contend that the ‘transformation of Kenya from a polyglot of strangers into a coherent state’ involved the use of force on a scale previously unknown in the region. There had long been opposition to British encroachments into trading along the Swahili coast, but with penetration inland the British also faced direct resistance from the Kikuyu and the Kamba, leading to military expeditions against them in 1896 and 1897. Weakened by civil war and cattle disease, the Maasai were persuaded to sign a treaty in 1892 allowing a railway to be driven through their lands. In 1910 they were forced to vacate whole tracts south of the new railway. The lack of extensive indigenous political networks made it difficult for the British to adopt their usual practice of coopting local elites in Kenya, in contrast to Uganda, a more centralised, hierarchical society dominated by the Baganda. This meant that British administrative policies, including language policies, could not avoid innovation.

Language and Colonial Administration in India, Malaya and East Africa

Administrative practices in colonial India

Much British administrative activity until the last decades of the empire can be explained as an attempt to divide and rule using the mechanism of reinventing
tradition. Debates over the best linguistic tools to do this polarised at first around the question of whether to favour classical learning (mostly Sanskrit, Persian and Arabic) or the vernaculars, and later around preferences for the language of the colonised or that of the colonisers. The British made use of existing langue francae such as Persian and Hindustani, although growing mistrust of the Muslim elites led some to advocate local vernaculars in order to avoid going through Persian interpreters. Among the EIC officials themselves there was a clear class division between those sent out as young as 13 with minimal education, unlikely to master unfamiliar work and language unless they were exceptionally talented (Pachori, 1990), and Oriental scholars with a public school background. From the 1740s more EIC officials were competent in Indian languages as postings away from the international fringes and for longer periods became common. Many Oriental scholars got their start as local EIC officers, including Warren Hastings himself, who learned Persian and Hindustani in his commercial dealings (Cohn, 1996). The consolidation of British power brought with it higher interest not only in vernaculars, leading to an energetic output of dictionaries and grammars, alongside publications about Indian laws and religions. Standardised grammars, often based on European models, reinvented vernaculars as much as they raised them up.

The EIC had traditionally been wary of missionaries, fearing they would engender unrest, but gradually became more tolerant, recognising the need to supplement the company’s limited resources with existing linguistic expertise (Pachori, 1990). The EIC charter of 1813 legalised missionary work and also allocated funds for education, stimulating debate between Anglicist administrators in favour of extending the use of English, and Orientalists, who were themselves divided into those in favour of the Indian classics, and those wanting more emphasis on the vernaculars. Few of the Christian missionaries had much time for the classics, but there were differences between those who favoured the vernaculars as the most effective way of proselytising, and those who favoured English. Robert King’s (1997) view is that the British never prioritised any language per se, but simply used whatever suited their administrative purposes. Pachori (1990: 104) maintains that the apparently contradictory aims of the ‘Indianisation of administration and the westernisation of India were virtually identical’ – political control and economic efficiency. For example, Curzon’s abortive 1908 plan for the division of Bengal ran roughshod over linguistic sensibilities, although the nationalist hostility it engendered among Bengalis brought greater attention to linguistic communities in later proposals for redrawning boundaries.

It should be noted that attitudes to language were similarly ambivalent on the nationalist side. The Indian National Congress was divided on the issue of linguistically based divisions. Gandhi held out against them, fearing they would be a distraction from more important issues, and emphasising unity through Hindustani instead. Yet in 1920 he reversed his position, apparently for the tactical reason of easing Muslim reservations about Hindu independence movements in Sindh. According to his biographer Selig Harrison (cited by King, 1997), Nehru seems sometimes to have supported language-based units within Congress as a tool for carrying nationalism to the masses, but at other times questioned whether redrawning administrative boundaries along linguistic lines
really helped the vernaculars. King concludes that since linguistic nationalism was on the ascendancy in India in the last decades of British rule as it had been in early 20th-century Europe, to go against it would have been damaging to any political movement.

**Administrative practices in colonial Malaya**

The increased use of English under Bentinck in the 1830s, and a greater emphasis on the vernaculars under Curzon at the turn of the 20th century, had repercussions on the other side of the Andaman Sea. However, while divide-and-rule in India was generally tempered by a fear of Muslim–Hindu conflict, British administrators could afford to be less even-handed in Malaya. The Malays were seen as the autochthonous inhabitants, and virtually all of them were Muslim. Even before the arrival of Islam, Malay had become a widely used administrative language, and through religion it had become the major mediator of ideas recorded by Arabs, Persians and Indians. Outside Java and Bali there was no strong written tradition in the region, and so Malay written in the Arabic Jawi script was also the major tool in the spread of literacy. British support for what was seen as traditional Malay culture even strayed over to largely non-Malay, non-Muslim Borneo, where Brookes encoded his first laws for Sarawak in the Malay language (Gunn, 1997). At the same time, the colonial authorities played an active role in a process of demographic diversification which weakened the position of Malay in relation not only to the vernaculars of other Asian communities but also with regard to English. Milner (1998) has written of the British colonial tendency to study ethnicities as given facts rather than constructions. Larger-scale ethnic identity seems gradually to have displaced local allegiance as decennial censuses from 1871 onward confirmed a steady rise in the number of immigrants from China and India. According to Shamsul (1998: 137) ethnic categories became ‘an idiom of official and everyday discourse when a host of legal codes and enactments... were introduced by the colonial government based on census-constructed ethnic categories’.

At first the Indian policy of dual government was adopted, involving the installation of Residents in each state to ‘advise’ local administrations. The willingness of the sultans to accept such an imposition stemmed largely from their diminished ability to control hereditary chiefs and levy taxes within their own states (Loh, 1975). At the 1903 Conference of Malay Rulers the Resident of Perak, J.P. Rodger, took pains to point out that the Protected States (if not the Settlement States) were not colonies at all, but independent sultanates receiving British help. This did not stop the British from reinventing Malay monarchical practices in ways that legitimised their own presence and helped to keep the political and educational aspirations of non-Malays in check. Loh (1975: 71) quotes from a secret Colonial Office despatch of 1932 that the Malay rulers were considered ‘a very necessary buffer between us and premature democratic developments’.

The prevailing British view of Malaya was of a resource-rich territory in need of economic development, yet thinly populated by a docile agricultural people who were best left undisturbed in their villages. One way through this contradiction was to import labour. Yet efficient government also required a local administrative class who would be cheaper than the Europeans who stood over them. The 1903 Conference proposed setting up an English school in each state to teach
local elites how to govern better. A token concession to Malay involvement in the Malay Civil Service was made with the employment of two locals (out of 160 posts) at the lowest level, but it was soon recognised that something more systematic was needed, and in 1910 the Malay Administrative Service was created, providing low-paid and small-scale administrative work for Malays while confirming their privileged position in relation to other communities. The path to the new civil service had been laid by educational reforms in 1906 which allowed the sons of the Malay elite to receive English schooling. Over the two decades between the world wars the more powerful Malay Civil Service recruited 20 Malays – but no Chinese or Indians. Malay government job-seekers greatly outstripped the posts available to them, however, particularly as economic depression led to a contraction in the civil service, including a reduction in recruitment from Britain.

**Administrative practices in colonial Kenya**

The partition of Africa among the European powers was to Britain’s relative advantage in terms of natural and human resources (Cain & Hopkins, 1993). Nevertheless the whole of Africa accounted for only 2% of British exports in 1920. Although there was all-party support in Britain for the principle of empire, this rarely materialised into a commitment to centralised funding for colonial development. Each colony was expected to finance its own development. In order to generate taxable resources and income-yielding exports it was necessary to raise loans and make enough profit to service and repay them. Colonial officials were constantly faced with the problem of financing an administration which could promote economic development while maintaining social stability. When the Crown assumed control from the Imperial British East Africa Company, it took on former company employees. In 1914 there were 369 British officers in Kenya, including 117 District Officers with general duties, 33 surveyors, and just eight educational officers (Kirk-Greene, 1999). To stretch meagre resources administrators fell back on the notion of ‘trusteeship’, or indirect rule through indigenous elites. Redolent of existing practices in India and Malaya, this was elaborated by Lord Lugard, high commissioner of Northern Nigeria, in *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*. The colonial rulers had a duty to facilitate modernising and civilising reform but without damaging traditional social structures. Wherever possible administration should therefore be through existing African hierarchies using local languages and customs. Significantly, this would also save money and get around linguistic and logistic difficulties faced by colonial officers while accruing them legitimacy.

Unlike in India and Malaya, however, the problem was to find suitable collaborators. Mazrui and Mazrui (1996) contrast the centralised, hierarchical society the British found in Uganda with the fragmented communities of pre-colonial Kenya. In the former the colonisers were working with existing elites, who became the first locals to make use of the colonial language. In Kenya the British had to find a new class of administrators. Cain and Hopkins (1993: 218) conclude they often made things up as they went along: ‘The attempt to identify indigenous forms of authority often resulted in social engineering which invented as much as it codified “native law and customs”, increased an awareness of “ethnicity” and “tribalism”, and created chiefs whose titles lacked historical legitimacy’.
Maasai religious leaders were given administrative powers they had never held before, and ‘ancient’ laws were discovered in consultation with chiefs whose memory of the unwritten codes somehow favoured their own political interests. After 1904 most of the African population were confined to reserved areas, ostensibly to protect them from socioeconomic disruption, but thereby protecting land acquired for the railway or European farms from disgruntled locals.

Since the end of the 19th century white settlers had been farming highland areas they considered vacant in spite of Kikuyu and other African claims. The settlers seem on the whole to have been against spreading political rights or English education to those ‘whose main vocation should be to work in the fields’ (Mazrui & Mazrui, 1996: 272). Coming from similar social backgrounds to the colonial civil servants (Cain & Hopkins, 1993) the settlers at first enjoyed good relations with the authorities, but came to be seen as a problem after the First World War when they agitated for home rule in line with dominions such as South Africa. Under pressure from the India Office, Colonial Secretary Devonshire formally ‘reserved’ Kenya for the Africans in 1923 in order to check these demands for home rule, thus minimising Churchill’s support of the white settlers. At the same time it was realised that the muddled concept of trusteeship would have to be reinforced with something more systematic. Supporters of administrative reform appeared to be vindicated by the report on 1935–8 riots in the West Indies which showed the colonial administrators as incompetent and negligent, prompting former prime minister Lloyd George’s condemnation of the ‘slumming Empire’ (Reynolds, 1991).

Education in colonial India

Hopkins (1999) has identified three phases in the development of colonial education: the long period down to the 1890s when nearly all schooling was left in the hands of missionaries, who were steadily co-opted by colonial authorities after initial mistrust; the decades down to the Second World War when the authorities constructed educational policies prioritising selected elites; and the lead-up to decolonisation when efforts were made to ensure that post-independence leadership would be favourable to British interests. According to this thesis the British did very little about education for most of their tenure of power, and even less about schooling the masses.

Yet Baqir (1998) argues that the socioeconomic modernisation brought to northern India by British colonialism did in fact have a powerful effect on education – and a negative one at that. He finds evidence for high rates of literacy among Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims at village level in an 1882 report by Leitner, Director of Public Instruction for the Punjab, and argues that British fiscal policies undermined these achievements by diverting funds from local communities to urban areas—a policy which was supported by Muslim and Hindu elites more concerned to be able to compete for colonial jobs than with education in the poorer sections of their own communities (Baqir, 1998).

The first educational projects by the British in India were to train their own officers. Hastings felt that Persian was vital for both civilian and military officers of the EIC, and William Jones’ 1771 Persian grammar was in great demand. Those excelling in the language were often rewarded by good positions in the central secretariat in Calcutta. According to Cohn (1996) language-learning had
three main objectives: understanding local customs and ways of conciliation; reviving ancient wisdom; and seeking legitimacy from the colonised. But early on there were differences between London and Calcutta over how best to achieve these objectives.

The EIC Directors in Britain were usually reluctant to allocate funds for education, especially for anything beyond practical language instruction for their own officers. For example, in the 1780s Hastings pressed for the establishment of a madrassah in Calcutta to satisfy local Muslim demands for education, followed by a Sanskrit college in Benares for the Hindus (Hastings, 1781–92). He hoped to create both local good will and potential sources of learning for British officials. But the new schools’ relevance to the EIC’s charter was questioned by the Directors, who used reports of corruption to reorganise the Calcutta Madrassah’s curriculum and intervene in the management of Sanskrit College. Similarly, London was reluctant to support courses at Wellesley’s 1800 Fort William College beyond practical language study. It was especially keen the college not become a centre of European learning for locals.

Many early schools experienced friction between the European and Indian teachers over pay differentials and also pedagogical methods. The former tended to find the latter pedantic and addicted to rote learning, although Francis Ellis, founder of the college at Fort St George in 1812 where Europeans studied Dravidian languages alongside Indians studying law, found the traditional Indian teaching practices well-suited to the subject-matter.

In 1793 the Anglicising and evangelising EIC director Grant called for missionaries and teachers to be sent from Britain, but was blocked by other officers such as Stephen Lushington and Randle Jackson who feared the spread of political ideas would lead to revolution as it had a decade before in America (Rahman, 1998). Grant was not insensitive to the view that English notions of liberty should be handled with care, but believed a grounding in English literature would turn Anglophones into Anglophiles. In the midst of this debate the renewed company charter of 1813 provided Rs100,000 for education. Although the original intention was to put this to promoting Indian classics, rising calls for English education from sections of Indian society itself strengthened the cause of the Anglicists. In 1820, the inhabitants of Panswell petitioned the Governor of Bombay for an English school in their area; Hindus in Punjab were more successful in their requests for English teachers. The money remained unspent as the medium of instruction debate unfolded.

In the early 19th century the Hindu elites, who had been something of an under-class in the Mughal Empire, favoured English more than the Muslims, but wanted Hindi recognised to the extent that Urdu was (Calvet, 1998). While Shah Abdul Aziz was describing English education as something ‘abhorrent’ and ‘improper’ for Muslims (Rahman, 1998), the Calcutta bourgeoisie were organising the Hindu College (opened 1816) so that their own elite could acquire English language and literature and European science. Rahman (1998) suggests that the Hindus were better able to adjust to English because their forefathers had previously had to accommodate to Persian. In 1823 a General Committee on Public Instruction (GCPI) was set up by the EIC to oversee the teaching of English science and literature through Hindi, which led to the establishment of the Sanskrit College of Calcutta in 1824. But five years later and under pressure
from Anglicist lobbies in Britain, the college switched to English-medium (Pachori, 1990).

Bentinck was appointed Governor-General in 1828. As well as being personally receptive to Anglicism he is thought to have been strongly influenced by the modernising Utilitarian Mill. Under Bentinck, Charles Trevelyan further pushed the view that the teaching of English literature was the key to winning friends in India (Rahman, 1996) and also set about winning the British press over to the Anglicists’ point of view. Thus the tide appeared to have turned against the Orientalists well before the appointment of Macaulay as president of the GCPI and his 1835 Minute on Education, in which he disparaged Indian classical learning and advocated the education of a class of ‘thoroughly good English scholars’ who would be loyal to the British, citing in support the desire of Indians to be taught English rather than Sanskrit or Arabic (text in Loh, 1975: 2). The Minute is often cited as a turning point in colonial education policy. In fact it was more symbolic than substantial.

For one thing, Macaulay was merely articulating well-established ideas. For another, his posting to India was relatively short, and his opponents in the civil services had by no means been neutralised by the time he left. H.H. Wilson and H.T Prinsep, for example, continued to protest against earmarking of funds for English, and there is evidence that the policy was undermined by various sections of the bureaucracy (Loh, 1975). Most importantly, like most of the other Anglicists, Macaulay advocated only limited access to English, perhaps because of the economic limitations he himself cited, or because of deeper-seated fears of mass education. Finance for any educational development remained strictly limited, and at primary level the vernacular was the rule (Loh, 1975). In a minute written in 1847 the Governor-General recommended that English schools not exceed one per province (Rahman, 1998). Despite growing demands for the language, the emphasis was on fee-paying schools for the few.

Mill (1836) thought the move towards English undermined faith in the consistency of British rule. He also feared it would reverse the growing interest in English that had been carefully fostered by the former gradualist approach. The Asiatic Society denounced the diversion of funds as ‘destructive, unjust, unpopular and impolitic’ (Rahman, 1998: 35), while the India Office in London feared an outright revolt against British rule. Apart from protests against the possible closure of the Madrassah and Sanskrit College (Mill, 1836), the projected unrest did not materialise. Moreover the Hindus were divided between those who welcomed English in order to counter the ghettoising effects of Orientalism, and traditionalists who ignored it to concentrate on religious issues. Meanwhile British civilian and military officers continued to sit language exams (in Devanagari, not in the Romanised script championed by Trevelyan), and District Officers continued to use vernaculars in their dealings with locals. What proficiency this class attained is a matter for conjecture: the wife of a political officer stationed at Gilgit reported the delight of the locals when her husband addressed them in Burushaski, but the literary image of Forsterian Collectors’ wives insisting on addressing English-educated Indian ladies in excruciating Hindi is a hard one to dispel and is reinforced by anecdotes from Kenya and other parts of the empire (e.g. Mazrui & Mazrui, 1995).
The establishment of so many English-medium schools in the decades following Macaulay does appear to provide ammunition for those who argue that Anglicisation was a major cause of the 1857 uprising. In 1835 the Calcutta Medical College opened using English. Trevelyan calculated that over 30,000 school texts in English were purchased in 1838, easily out-selling Bengali (nearly 6000), Urdu (3500) and Persian (1500) put together (Rahman, 1998). Governor-General Auckland (1836–42) continued and expanded on Bentinck’s educational reforms, while Charles Wood set up India’s first Western-style universities during the Dalhousie administration (1848–56). However, it should be reiterated that English hardly went beyond a small elite, and at this stage it was not the anti-colonial elite which it was to become in the 20th century. Very few even from this class went beyond secondary education. Wood’s universities were not teaching institutions in their own right but places where London University exams could be sat. Their founder helped to establish vernacular as well as English-medium high schools, overseen by a department of education in each province. He also supported the growth of private, and thus elitist, schools.

While 1857 may have checked any downward permeation of English, the sons of the Indian aristocracy (especially the increasingly favoured Hindus) came more and more to pass through Chiefs Colleges which were facsimiles of British public schools, such as Mayo (founded in Ajmer, 1872) and Aitchison (1886, Lahore – which today grooms many of Pakistan’s ruling elite). Although oriental departments at Bareilly and Agra were forced to close because of suspected anti-British Islamic radicalism (Rahman, 1998), the Muslims were not entirely left out of this elitist growth in education. In 1875 Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, an Anglophile who blamed religious instruction for the social stagnation of the Muslim community, founded Anglo-Oriental College, which became Aligarh Muslim University in 1920 (King, 1997), and a Scientific Society charged with translating English works into Urdu (Al Mujahid, 2000). Below these colleges were schools for the lesser landed gentry, and some English-medium schools targeting the children of the professional European classes but allowed a quota of Indian pupils (usually 15%, but 20% in the state of Bombay). The educational standards were higher than those of the Chiefs Colleges. By the time of partition there were a number of other institutions teaching predominantly in English, such as St Joseph’s in Karachi, and Government College in Abbottabad. While these were clearly of a better standard than the vernacular schools, Rahman (1998) concludes that the difference came from greater funding rather than better methods.

Pennycook has pointed out that the restriction of English to the elites did not make its impact negligible, since the intention implicit in Macaulay’s Minute was to start a trickle-down effect ‘providing an English-educated elite and a vernacular-educated population better able to participate in a colonial economy’ (Pennycook, 1994: 82). As in the present Commonwealth, it was a question of who, not how many, knew English. By 1882, 60% of the primary schools in British India were English-medium (Krishnamurti, 1990), but literacy in English remained confined to under 1% of the population, leading Cook (1996) to conclude that the Indian elites were even more restrictive of English learning than the British themselves. Since their original enthusiasm for English had been on the very pragmatic grounds of maintaining their status and improving their
economic position, they were disinclined to give up their advantage. The result was a horizontal division between linguistically based proto-elites jockeying for power, and a vertical division between the Anglophone and Westernised Indian elite, and those below them restricted to the vernaculars (Rahman, 1998). As King puts it:

By the end of the nineteenth century English was as firmly entrenched as the English themselves in India, which is to say not as firmly entrenched as it appeared on the surface at the time (King, 1997: 16).

At the turn of the century education policy moved further away from English toward the vernaculars. With the 1857 uprising a safe half century behind and independence a further half century off, it is not clear just why. With a system of compulsory education in place in Britain since 1870, dismay at the elite nature of Indian schooling may have played its part. Governor-General Curzon (1898–1905) felt that ‘no people will ever use another tongue with advantage that cannot use its own with ease’ (cited in Krishnamurti, 1990: 17). Jinnah saw the neglect of elementary education as deliberate, however, and ‘one of the greatest reproaches against the British rule’ (Jalil, 1998: 24). Since Curzon had a record of opposing increases to the number of Indian observers on LegCos (local legislative councils), it seems his educational views were not unconnected with a desire to slow down social change.

Vernacular education had long been synonymous in British minds with lower-level schooling; in 1867 the government argued against vernacular higher education because of the lack of texts, and refused a specific request for it from the Punjab the following year. An education commission of 1882 specified a role for cheap government schools for the instruction of the masses through the vernacular but not necessarily leading up to university (Rahman, 1998). Rahman argues that British policy towards Pashto – ‘learning it themselves for control, while denying its use in the domains of power for the natives’ – was symptomatic of a general tendency to accord different domains to different languages for the purpose of dividing and ruling (1998: 138).

In general, then, English came to dominate higher domains while the importance of vernaculars increased lower down. The 1913 Resolution on Education Policy established a system of vernacular schooling at primary and secondary level, while the 1917 Sadler Commission advocated the use of vernaculars through to tertiary level while calling for English to be limited to universities – which were made fully fledged teaching establishments by the 1904 Universities Act. At the 1924 Simla Conference it was agreed to use the vernaculars up to middle secondary level in United Provinces (Uttar Pradesh), Punjab and North West Frontier, while there was increasing discussion of vernacularising the universities (Rahman, 1998), but although the University of Punjab offered one paper in Urdu, vernacularisation was largely confined to the lower levels of education, even though a 1939 report on education linked a steady increase in vernacular-using schools in the Sindh with a rise in educational standards.

Meanwhile, the nationwide development of an Indian lingua franca was undermined by Muslim-Hindu divisions. In 1906 Congress embraced the spirit of the times by passing a resolution in favour of vernacular education, but Hindu, Muslim – and also Bengali – sectarianism paralysed attempts to form an effective
education policy (Dasgupta, 1993). This was a period when the growing nationalism of the Anglicised elite was tempered by revived Muslim confidence and growing divisions with the Hindus in which language was rarely a primary issue but more a symbol of religious identity. Far from foisting English upon India, the majority of British language planners had been more interested in the idea of Hindustani as a lingua franca, at least for the northern part of the country. This was a language which could be heavily Persianised and later adopted by the British for administration in North West Frontier Province, and yet had the potential to unite Muslims and Hindus in its mesolectal and baprolectal variations. To this effect the Lieutenant-Governor of Bihar in 1872 ordered Persianised Urdu to be replaced by mesolectal Hindi in court pleadings (Rahman, 1998), while A.W. Croft, the Inspector of Schools, condemned heavily Sanskritised Hindi. Urdu was important in some predominantly Muslim areas such as Balochistan and North West Frontier, and it was a medium of instruction for Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus alike in Punjab, where most (but not all) British preferred it to lower-status, less-standardised and potentially marginalising Panjabi. But each religious community came more and more to differentiate its form of the language in the battle for status, resulting in greater politicisation of linguistic issues. By the time Nehru proposed his potentially unifying Basic Hindustani (inspired by reading C.K Ogden’s Basic English while in gaol in 1934) Urdu and Hindi were thought of as different languages by almost everyone. At the same time, the nationalists continued to talk to each other in English:

From the British point of view, the most important political consequence of educating the Indian elite in English was that language was never used by it as a major symbol of resistance. The Westernised elite either served the British as junior partners or opposed them with reference to Western ideas of democracy, human rights, liberty, and legality, but not language (Rahman, 1998: 58).

Education in colonial Malaya

Education in precolonial Malaya had been almost entirely of a religious nature, and did not include instruction in the Malay language that the children brought with them to school (Mohamed Nor Abdulsamat, 1983). It was also essentially integrative rather than instrumental, affording very little opportunity for social mobility (Loh, 1975).

One of the first colleges for colonial officers was the Singapore Institution, set up by Raffles in 1823, shortly before his death, to teach Chinese, Malay and Siamese as well as literature, morals and science. The first formal education for Malays (in Malay) started at the Penang Free School from 1821 (Gunn, 1997). But there was little growth in Malay schooling until an 1854 dispatch from the EIC Court of Directors to the Governor-General of India (then directly responsible for the Straits Settlements) encouraged establishment of a small number of free vernacular schools teaching Malay in both the rumi and Arabic scripts. The Unfederated States of Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu, which were outside formal British control until 1910, did not establish Malay schools till 1897, 1903
and 1915 respectively (Mohamed, 1983). Sarawak got its first modern Malay school at Kuching in 1883 (Gunn, 1997).

At first there was little enthusiasm from the Malay community for classes in their own language, but secular schools slowly came to outnumber Qur’anic. The Inspector of Schools for the Straits Settlements reported that there were 16 Malay schools and 598 pupils in 1872, rising to 50 schools and 1222 pupils two years later, as against 19 English schools teaching 1761 pupils. But by 1882 there were 85 schools teaching 2230 Malays, and 10 years later 189 schools for 7218 (Gunn, 1997). Solomon (1987) suggests that one reason for this rapid growth was a decision by the colonial authorities to allow Qur’anic study, although in theory this was supposed to take place in the afternoon at the local community’s expense (Loh, 1975). Training of Malay teachers began in 1878 at Telok Belanga in Singapore. In 1900 a teacher training college was set up in Malacca at the request of the Federated States Schools Inspector Wilkinson, followed by others in Matang (1913) and Sultan Idriss (1922). The first women teachers college was established in Malacca in 1935 (Soloman, 1987). Wilkinson also introduced instruction in Malay at the English schools. However his post was abolished in 1906 and his administrative functions taken over by J.B. Elcum, who according to Loh’s (1975) description was interested in education fit only for rubber-tappers.

English education in Malaya began in the Free Schools (forerunners of government schools) of the Straits Settlements: at Penang in 1816, Singapore in 1824 and Malacca in 1826. Malay classes were introduced at secondary level but usually taken by Malay pupils who had transferred from Malay medium primary education. The government of the Straits Settlements also allowed some English-medium missionary schools, which were mostly attended by fee-paying Chinese (Pennycook, 1994). By the Japanese occupation 75% of Peninsular Malaya’s English-medium pupils were in government or missionary schools (Yeoh, 1986).

The 1880s saw a slow introduction of English into urban areas of the Federated States of Perak and Selangor, as well as at the ‘Rajah School’ set up for the sons of sultans in 1890. Responding to a perceived need for more Malay administrators, the Federated States Schools Inspector Wilkinson established the Malay Residential School in 1905, which moved to Kuala Kangsar as Malay College in 1907. Although its first Resident-General favoured an open policy, very few commoners were admitted until the 1920s. In Standard VII an exam could be taken which would qualify students for the civil service. Loh (1975) has pointed out that those wealthy or privileged enough to attend English schools in this era were exposed to a shared normative system which moulded the elite that carried Malaya into the postcolonial era. Solomon (1987) adds that in a highly communalised educational system the English schools were uniquely multiracial. English education progressed more slowly in the Unfederated States, where British officials conducted local business in Malay as well as English, tending to use the former more as their length of service in Malaya grew longer (Ho, 1984).

The alternative to missionary schools for most of the Chinese community was to fund their own vernacular schools. A long tradition of importing teachers and texts from China was stimulated by the nationalism of the 1911 Revolution, which also brought a preference for Mandarin over other Chinese media of instruction. The authorities looked for ways of exerting control from the 1920s, requiring schools to register but offering them grants-in-aid in return (Soloman,
1987). Governor Clementi, who had served in Hong Kong before arriving in Malaya in 1934, was particularly wary of Chinese nationalism, seeking to limit Chinese-medium education and encourage attendance at Malay schools instead (Pennycook, 1994). Tang Cheng Lock, the LegCo Member for Malacca, campaigned for a combination of Chinese vernacular schools and free English education, preferring the latter to Malay as an inter-communal language (Pennycook, 1994). The grants were dropped in the 1930s, ostensibly because of the contracting economy but presumably also as a way of cutting support for Chinese schooling.

Indian education in Malaya dates back to 1834 at the Singapore Free School (Soloman, 1987) but was mostly an extension of colonial welfare policy (Muthusami, 1987). The 1923 Federal Malay States Labour Ordinance, for example, required a primary school on every estate. Instruction was most commonly in Tamil by a teacher brought over from India. By 1938 there were 511 of these schools. There were also 13 government, 23 missionary and 69 private schools for Indians (Soloman, 1987), producing an Anglophone Indian elite who typically sought government employment.

By the early 20th century, then, a clear ethnically differentiated pattern had emerged: free vernacular instruction for Malays in the villages, and also free or subsidised vernacular education for Tamils on the estates; subsidised fee-charging English education in urban areas, attended mostly by Europeans and wealthier Chinese and Indians; and self-financed Chinese schooling. Asmah (1996) has described this colonial system as exclusionist and divisive, keeping 99% of Malays away from English. For Pennycook (1994) the British neglect of Chinese and Indian education was designed to filter a small minority of them into English-medium missionary schools to be joined at secondary level by a Malay elite which trailed them in English, thus producing a trans-ethnic Anglophone middle class standing above sharply divided communities. On the other hand, Muthusami (1987) sees no consistent colonial education policy at all because of divisions between the Straits Settlements and the Federated and Unfederated States, although he does concede that there was a marked overall preference for confining instruction to the vernaculars – perhaps out of fears of rampant Macaulayism.

Pennycook (1994) claims that Malaya attracted a more romantic and paternalistic brand of colonialist than anywhere else, according Malay culture more respect than that of the Africans and feeling a greater sense of responsibility for the social disruptions brought by economic development. Hugh Clifford, Resident of Pahang in 1898, appears to have been typical in combining protective-ness – ‘we are morally responsible for the evil that is done in our name’ – with condescension towards the docile Malay ‘who never works if he can help it’ (Studies in Brown Humanity, cited in Pennycook, 1994: 89). A similar mentality could be found in R.O. Windstedt, who rose to be Director of Education of the Straits Settlements and exerted a powerful influence until retiring in 1935. His educational report of 1910 emphasised the need for vocational and practical training which would be useful in the Malay villages but little help in taking anyone beyond village life. It led to a reduction in the maximum period of primary schooling to four years. At the same time, Malays wishing to transfer to English-medium education had first to have completed these four years in their
vernacular, giving a distinctive advantage to the Chinese for whom no such rule applied since they funded their own vernacular schools.

There is a case for saying that the Malays shunned English education through fear of being Christianised (Asmah, 1996). However, there is ample evidence that the British themselves intended to ghettoise most of the Malays. E.C. Hill, an Inspector of Schools and by no means an Orientalist, counselled in the 1884 Straits Settlements Report against increasing the proportion of places for Malays in English schools beyond the current 8%, arguing that there was not enough money to subsidise them and that it would create a discontented class who could not be given employment commensurate with their expectations (Pennycook, 1994). Loh (1975: 15) quotes Frank Swettenham (a future High Commissioner) in the 1890 Perak Report thus: ‘Whilst we teach children to read and write and count in their own language, or in Malay . . . we are safe’.

Curzon’s attempts to hold back the tide of English in India were particularly influential in Malaya. Hill’s successor, H.B. Collinge, reported in 1894 that it was above all the imparting of a ‘mere smattering of English and English ideas’ to increasing numbers in India which was in danger of causing social unrest (Pennycook, 1994: 87). Conversely he saw a couple of years of vernacular schooling for Malay boys as likely to make them more respectful of their parents and more appreciative of the benevolence of the British. Pennycook (1994: 94) finds evidence for this exclusionism higher up the administrative chain in the person of Colonial Secretary Caldecott, who thought it would be ‘criminal folly to make [English] the basic language of primary education’ as long as it possessed rarity value as a key to ‘sweatless labour’. He cites four reasons against English given by Governor Clementi in the 1930s: much higher cost than education in Malay; risk of discontent and unemployment, as had happened in India; Westernisation of the villages; and pedagogical unsuitability. It was much the same story in Borneo: in Sarawak, the Brooke regime continued to block English instruction at Kuching’s Malay College (Gunn, 1997), while in 1935 the Governor of North Borneo announced that the main object of vernacular schools was to teach boys, the great majority of whom would go back to the land, to be good cultivators and good citizens.

The shift to cash-crop agriculture in the early 20th century brought greater social mobility to the Malay community (Loh, 1975). Even in rural areas wariness of English education was gradually displaced by interest. The Chief Secretary of the Federated Malay States closed down English classes in Klang soon after local authorities set them up and rejected a 1919 petition for free English education for Malays. Attempts by Clementi to decentralise administration increased the number of Malays employed by the government, and this also raised the demand for English. In 1920, 10% of pupils in English schools were Malays; in 1926, nearly 20% (Loh, 1975). By the 1930s British officials found it increasingly difficult to defend Winstedtian curricula against Malay demands for better, and above all, English education (Gunn, 1997).

The Japanese occupation of 1941–5 did not succeed in spreading the Japanese language very far, but it did have important language planning consequences. Gunn (1997) remarks on the enthusiasm the Japanese put into the huge task of spreading their language from Singapore to Brunei, starting with teachers and government officials, but even reaching out to the villagers. In Kelantan schools
three hours of Japanese instruction per week were initially offered (Mohamed, 1983). Through language and education, the Japanese sought to reach the Malays psychologically in a spiritual campaign notably lacking in the British cultural programme. In Pahang teachers making progress in Japanese were offered the incentive of rapid promotion to principal (Kratoska, 1998). The results were limited, however, possibly through a lack of resources as the war progressed as much as a lack of enthusiasm from the Malays (there was little expectation that the Chinese would embrace the Japanese occupation positively). Teaching texts often had English instructions, making them of limited use to rural Malays. Kratoska (1998) concludes that the cultural policies of the Japanese were undermined by their lack of local knowledge compared with the British, and by their own linguistic deficiencies.

Instead of Japanese, Malay became the preferred medium for administration, education, and propaganda. Romanised Malay instruction continued, and Tamil was also tolerated, but attempts were made early on to close English and Chinese schools, some being converted to Japanese-medium (Kratoska, 1998). Pro-Japanese Malay publications such as Berita Malai and Semangat Asia were launched in Singapore, and a Malay-language radio network was set up throughout Malaya and Indonesia (Gunn, 1997). Syonan Koua Kunrenjo (Singapore Leading Officers Training Institute) was established to train local officials, including instruction in Japanese. It was still found necessary to use the language of the former colonisers, even though few of the new occupiers knew it well. Singapore saw a spate of pro-Japanese English newspapers such as Singapore Herald and Nippon Times. In Kuala Lumpur there was Marei Shinpou, in Ipoh Para Shinbun, and in Penang Pinang Shinbun. The goal of making Japanese the lingua franca of East Asia failed, and was even less successful in Malaya than in Indonesia, where Japanese took over some domains formerly occupied by Dutch. But the temporary displacement of the British and promotion of Malay was of some help to Malayan linguistic and cultural nationalism after the war.

**Education in colonial Kenya**

Christian missionaries pioneered Western educational forms in Kenya and maintained a higher profile than in Malaysia or Pakistan. In contrast to the latter there was an early identity between colonial aims of training the mind and missionary aims of winning souls (Mazrui & Mazrui, 1998). In 1846 the Church Missionary Society set up a school at Rabai near Mombassa where lessons focused on Christianity and on agricultural or clerical skills. By the mid-19th century reading in English or German, Christianity, and practical subjects like carpentry and gardening were being taught at several coastal schools, but penetration inland had to wait until the end of the century, receiving a boost from the completion of the Mombassa–Uganda Railway, which bisected Maasai lands and undermined their opposition. Schools built on Maasai lands were of limited interest to the locals.

The choice of instruction medium was between local vernaculars, Kiswahili, or English. Each had its merits for the Christians. The Livingstonian missionaries tended to favour the vernaculars, although some preferred Kiswahili because it was already a vehicle of monotheism rather than animism (Mazrui & Mazrui, 1998). Some missionaries saw value in Kiswahili as a transitional language which
could modernise local vernaculars by lending lexis and concepts useful for proselytisation. Others were hostile because of the associations between Kiswahili and the predominantly Muslim Swahili people:

English? Yes! But Swahili never. The one means the Bible and Protestant Christianity – the other Mohammedism... sensuality, moral and physical degradation and ruin (Bishop Tucker of Uganda, in Mackay, 1908: Fifteen Years in Uganda and East Africa, cited in Mazrui & Mazrui, 1998: 74).

In addition to the missionaries, colonial authorities had to consider the preferences of commercial interests and European settlers, who mostly favoured Kiswahili for its potential to form a class of labourers from disparate communities. Mazrui and Mazrui (1996) consider that the European population was solidly against the spread of English until the more interventionist imperialism of the 1950s. In 1907 the capital of the Protectorate moved from Swahili Mombassa to Kikuyu Nairobi. Ironically the move may have increased the importance of Kiswahili because it helped to spread the language inland and met little competition from Gikuyu, which was associated with a people regarded with suspicion by other Kenyans for collaborating with white settlers (Mazrui & Mazrui, 1998).

The Frazer Report of 1909 recommended a linguistically segregated education system for the Africans, Asians, and Europeans (and later Arabs) with a focus on vocational subjects for the Africans. By this time there were 35 mission schools in Kenya. However, Mazrui and Mazrui (1996) contend that many of the most important language developments, and in particular the spread of Kiswahili, took place independently of educational structures. Kiswahili was first and foremost a language of trade. Its penetration inland was slowed by encounters with communities uninterested in commerce, yet along the coast it evolved into a powerful vehicle not just of the religion brought by the Arabs, but of their commercial activities. Thus Mazrui and Mazrui (1996) warn against tendencies to exaggerate the language’s religious and sentimental value, stressing that historically it was first and foremost an instrumental link language. For this reason it was also attractive to the colonial administrators seeking to establish centralised structures of command and develop vertical chains of loyalty.

The policy of trusteeship left nearly all African education either to tradition, or to the missionaries. The Education Commission of 1919, and the Phelps–Stokes Report of 1925 emphasised vocational subjects taught in the vernacular, although the latter stressed that no one should be denied access to English. In some areas there seems to have been enough innovation to cause friction. In the 1930s the Karinga Kikuyu Association and the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association were set up to encourage boycotts of the missions and set up schools whose curricula, which included Christianity, would be closer to traditional customs.

An educational report published soon after the Second World War proposed using the vernaculars in the first four grades of primary school before switching to Kiswahili medium, with English introduced as a subject with a view to using it as a medium of instruction for secondary education. However, the following decade saw a steady erosion of the status of Kiswahili. The Beecher Report to the Advisory Council of African Education in 1949 recommended a direct transition
from the vernaculars at primary level, to English medium at secondary. Around the same time Kiswahili lost its status as a vernacular medium in Uganda. In 1953—the year UNESCO promulgated the importance of mother-tongue instruction—English was made a compulsory subject in the primary school-leaving exam, while the following year the 1954 Binns Commission questioned the use of Kiswahili on pedagogical grounds, arguing that it was a diversion of limited resources. In 1955 the Dow East Africa Commission also expressed support for English, reflecting a wider shift in British colonial policy in the last decade of empire to ensure that the postcolonial rulers would be favourable to British interests.

**Language, Decolonisation, and the New Postcolonial Order**

**Imperial preference and unity**

Far from retreating from empire, Britain only really started to value it towards the end, looking for ways to reorganise and reinvigorate. While the new policies did not prevent the loss of the colonies, they helped shape decolonisation in such a way that it was not the economic or political trauma it proved to be for other imperial powers such as France, where it brought down a republic.

Even before the Second World War there were plans for invigorating the empire through greater central intervention. Alfred Milner was a strong advocate of social imperialism in the War Cabinet of 1916 (Cain & Hopkins, 1993) and by the end of the 1914–18 war, two-thirds of the domestic economy was being directed by government bodies. The economic and diplomatic rise of the United States boosted support for managed imperialism as a way of maintaining Britain’s global position. However, the collapse of Germany as an economic rival and the postwar restocking boom reassured free traders that there could be a return to the old order of a strong pound and tight Treasury control of central funding. Sterling returned to the gold standard at prewar rates in 1925. But the rest of the decade was spent struggling to restore the old hegemony in a world of shrinking markets and trying to repay wartime debts to the Americans at a time when reparations from Germany were having to be scaled down. The global financial collapse of 1929 brought general acceptance that a more interventionist approach was in order.

Although Britain was hit by the depression of the 1930s, America and the rest of Europe were hit harder. The volume of exports in the mid 1930s was only 60% of 1913 levels, yet Britain’s share of the world market rose (Cain & Hopkins, 1993). With the world retreating into protectionism, trade within the empire became increasingly important, especially exports of manufacturers to the dominions in return for raw materials. The Ottawa tariff agreements of 1932 extended the policy of imperial preference, and formalised the Sterling Area (whereby the Treasury maintained financial control by buying all hard currency earned by the colonies at a fixed price and credited it against sterling balances in London). Cain and Hopkins emphasise that the new policies did not mean an end to tight Treasury control, however: ‘In economic policy terms there was little change in fundamentals during the 1930s. Governments were not even Keynesian in drift, let alone policies’ (Cain & Hopkins, 1993).
Developments in imperial cultural and educational policies

From this economic background a more unified administrative and cultural approach gradually emerged. In 1927 the first Colonial Conference Committee on Education contemplated policies for the whole empire. At the second conference in 1930 there was an agreement to rationalise colonial services, and in 1937, a unified Colonial Education service was formed. With Labour in the wartime government, the Drogheda Report and two Colonial and Development Welfare Acts (1940, 1945) show an unprecedented willingness to spend money on the colonies even though money was in unprecedented short supply.

With New Deal America withdrawing from its new global role, Britain felt itself more of a world power than ever in the 1930s, and developed a keener sense of the cultural side of imperialism. In 1935 the British Council (for Relations with Other Countries) was set up to use British educational and business interests to counter fascist propaganda in Europe. Pennycook (1994) has thereby questioned the plausibility of its claims to be non-political. A decade later the Council started to concentrate more on education than culture, and more on developing countries than Europe. It thus had obvious significance for a worldwide programme of decolonisation. After the Second World War there was consultation with the United States over how best to promote English at a time when America was changing its ELT focus from immigrants at home to learners overseas. In 1957 it helped to found Britain’s first applied linguistics department at the University of Edinburgh. Pennycook feels that since the 1950s the Council no longer makes any bones about its mission to sell English (citing, for example its 1968 Annual Report). Roy-Campbell and Quorro (1997) mention a 1994 Council enquiry in Tanzania which found that English-medium instruction was no longer viable yet promised British government funding for initiatives to revive it.

Contemplating an Allied victory in World War II, Churchill suggested that the widespread use of C.K. Ogdon’s Basic English ‘would be a gain to [Britain] far more durable and fruitful than the annexation of great provinces’ (quoted in Pennycook, 1994: 130). There is no doubt that the international resurgence of America during the Second World War, while deplored from a cultural point of view by writers such as Orwell, boosted Anglistics on both sides of the Atlantic. The educationalist Frederick Bodmer, by no means an ethnocentric chauvinist, thought that there were practical reasons for people the world over preferring Anglo-American to any other international language (Bodmer, 1944), contrasting it with the ‘ponderous and obscure’ language that had enabled Hegel to take in three generations of Germans (Bodmer, 1944).

But for Cain and Hopkins (1993), although British neocolonialism can certainly be found in parts of the former empire, the globalised financial system that emerged in the postwar era was more significant. Since it was led by American business, however, it gets increasingly difficult to disentangle the continuation of Britain’s influence in former colonies from the new Pax Americana in which it participated. The Cold War in turn brought greater American connivance in the British way of decolonisation as Truman’s fears of communism made Britain’s continued control of strategic bases more important than anti-colonial principles (Godemont, 1997).
Decolonisation in India and Pakistan

The policy of cultivating a small Anglophone elite had become more explicit in the later 19th century. Lytton’s 1878 Vernacular Press Act censored newspapers in Indian languages but exempted English (Ngô mentions that in Kenya too publications in English were hardly ever banned). Aitchison’s 1886 Public Service Commission recommended recruiting Indians with high competence in English (King, 1997). Cook (1996) has observed that the British thereby fed Indian nationalism by providing linguistic and administrative unity. Rahman (1996) remarks that significant sections of this Anglicised elite had absorbed democratic and liberal ideas. Thus the colonial authorities’ historical fears of spreading English seem to have been well founded. But (at least) one common language was not enough to heal the growing rift between Congress and Jinnah’s Muslim League – which the British supported increasingly as a counterweight to Hindu nationalism.

Some historians have seen concessions to Congress in the 1920s and 1930s as signs of British weakness and part of an enforced retreat from empire. Hopkins (1999) sees them more as calculated tactical adjustments to economic and political changes. The jewel in the crown was becoming less important to imperial economics, buying fewer manufacturers from Britain after the yen depreciations of the 1920s (Cain & Hopkins, 1993). Besides, industrialists still counted for far less than the financiers, whose main concern was India’s rising debts. With the 1935 Government of India Act the Indian elite was offered a greater share in government in return for staying in the capitalist game and making sure the country repaid its loans. The authorities used wartime powers to suppress the 1942–3 Quit India campaign and again hoped to divide the nationalists by supporting Jinnah. But by this time British officers were in the minority in the Indian Civil Service (Cain & Hopkins, 1993). The war increased the perception among Britain’s financiers – who, according to Cain and Hopkins were still in control of colonial policy – that India might not be worth fighting for even if there was the manpower to do so. Once the British decided upon partition, it took on a violent momentum in which religious-based communalism overwhelmed ties of language.

Decolonisation in Malaya and Borneo

Despite the exhausting and impoverishing effect of war and the loss of India soon after, there was a renewed commitment to empire in the 1940s and 1950s based on calculation as much as sentiment (Cain & Hopkins, 1993). Having lost 15% of its total assets during the First World War, Britain lost 28% of the remainder during the Second (Reynolds, 1991). Yet the accelerated end of the war because of the atomic bombs allowed a rapid recovery of Asian territories without needing to wait for American help and conditions. There was mounting pressure from the United States either to wind up the empire altogether, or devote resources to running it more democratically and humanely. Creech-Jones, Labour’s new Colonial Secretary, was determined to show that this could be done. Wartime mobilisation had tilted the scales in favour of those seeking to replace indirect rule with more systematic administration, and the postwar ‘second colonial occupation’ made use of a new generation of technical specialists.
(Harper, 1999). ‘Elements of pre-war paternalism survived. But under the technocratic regime of reconstruction, welfare assumed the guise of a coordinated ideological and practical initiative’ (Harper, 1999: 59). In 1947–8 recruitment into the colonial services was up by 50% (Reynolds, 1991). Although Britain emerged from the war as the world’s biggest debtor (Cain & Hopkins, 1993), it saw in the empire its best chance to recover economically and politically.

The new Labour government pursued a vigorous foreign and colonial policy, creating the Commonwealth to maintain ties with India and Pakistan, and reinforcing bases to counter the growth of communism. By 1954 Britain’s defence budget was almost 8% of GDP – higher than in the US. Following Indian independence, the Cohen Report revealed a growing sense in the colonial civil services that Britain must shape and direct nationalism rather than be overwhelmed by it. Greater self-government based on elites tied to British interests was contemplated. Reynolds (1991) argues that decolonial ‘nation-building was therefore a British strategy for informal empire, and not simply the result of anti-colonial pressures’. Federalisation and other administrative reforms were tried out in the search for a postcolonial order which would not be unfavourable to British interests. Malaya was the most valuable of all the surviving colonies, supplying nearly all of America’s tin and half of its rubber, and netting over $170 million in export earnings. It was central to London’s defence of the Sterling Area against US pressure to create a new financial order based on the dollar.

Administrative reform involved ending financial self-sufficiency and de-emphasising communalty. In 1946 the Brookes’ rule in Sarawak was transferred to the Crown, despite little enthusiasm from the local Iban (Tarling, 1998). In Malaya sovereignty was taken from the sultans in order to set up a unitary government more responsive to Britain’s economic needs and also to American calls for greater democracy (Stockwell, 1984). During the war the Malays had been seen as less reliable allies than the Chinese, who together with the Indians made a push for more involvement in administration. The extent of the shift was revealed by the strong opposition from the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) to the Union. In 1948 the old Anglo–Malay coalition was revived with a new federal constitution. One reason for British capitulation appears to have been fear that the Malays would turn to collaboration with Indonesian nationalists who were still fighting the Dutch (Tarling, 1998). Another was mounting suspicion of Chinese support for communist insurgency. Anglo–Malay relations were shaken in 1951 by Hussein Onn’s departure from UMNO in search of a more multiracial political solution, and also by the assassination of High Commissioner Gurney, who had been determined Britain should not acquire the anti-Asian reputation of the Dutch in Indonesia or the French in Vietnam. However, the general plan to continue managing Malaya’s wealth by cultivating pro-British elites remained intact, and the British remained on better terms with the Malays than they did with the Mau Mau-tainted Kikuyu in Kenya.

According to Said (1993), the lack of an ideological struggle for independence meant there was ‘no intellectual break with British ideological thinking’. Actually there was a struggle – with a communist insurgency that drew much of its support from discontented Chinese (Godemont, 1997). But the military campaign waged against this from 1948 strengthened the Anglo–Malay alliance, while helping to bring on board the Malayan Chinese Association and Malay
Indian Congress. This UMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance won the elections of 1955 under Tunku Abdul Rahman and formed the political basis of the new state which emerged in 1957. In 1963, Sarawak and Sabah were brought into a Federation of Malaysia, but Singapore seceded in 1965 because of objections to pro-Malay policies.

The Anglophone Malay elite was at first equivocal about language policy, with several cases of Malay politicians being criticised for using English (Harper, 1999). Under the pre-independence Federal Agreement Malay and English were supposed to have equal status. The 1950s saw increasing support for inter-communal Malay. Promotion of the language, which Mahathir Mohamad referred to in 1949 as ‘hopelessly inadequate’ (Straits Times, 24 April 1949: Malay Modern and Standard, in Mahathir, 1995), involved some standardisation, creating tensions between modernisers and those who accused them of creating a dumbed-down form of the language. Potential opposition from the Chinese, whether they were communist supporters or not, was the biggest question mark hanging over the new state. New citizenship rules in 1952 had required proof that one parent was Malayan-born and competence in Malay or English (often relaxed for the elderly). With 75% of the population registered by 1953, there were 2.7 million Malay citizens to 1.2 million Chinese (Chai, 1977).

Meanwhile several proposals were made for education. The Cheeseman Programme of 1945–9 had recommended the vernaculars for primary, and a choice at secondary school between English medium plus vernacular subject or the reverse. The 1951 Barnes Committee and Fenn-Wa Report called for an English–Malay bilingual system (with the latter providing a temporary role for Chinese). In reaction, Chinese and Indian committees were set up to promote their own vernaculars (Mohamed, 1983). An educational ordinance of the following year proposed English or Malay medium primary schools, with the other language to be a compulsory subject. Chinese and Tamil schools could continue but would need to be trilingual, which brought some protest from their respective communities (Soloman, 1987). The 1955 Razak Committee stressed the importance of a single system of education and language of instruction, yet tried to combine these various plans, recommending Malay-medium ‘Standard’ primary and other medium ‘Non-standard’ schools, and a choice of Malay or English-medium secondary schools with a vague aim of promoting bilingualism. For Sarawak and later Sabah, the Woodhead Report proposed Chinese or Malay primary schools with an option of transferring to English medium at secondary level. In Singapore instruction in Malay, Chinese, Tamil or English was proposed, with the latter to be a compulsory subject (Pennycook, 1994).

Asmah (1979) has concluded that on the eve of independence the country could not afford the potential divisiveness of a multilingual or even bilingual system, thus justifying the 1957 education ordinance which set up ‘National’ Malay-medium and ‘National-type’ Chinese and Tamil primary schools where Malay would be a compulsory subject, followed by Malay-medium secondary schools in which other languages could be taught as subjects where 15 or more pupils requested it. This move towards Malay as an instrument of national unity was reflected in the Reid Constitutional Commission, which recommended making Bahasa Melayu the sole official language within 10 years of
independence, with the option of continuing with English in areas it was deemed necessary.

**Decolonisation in Kenya**

The economic importance of the African colonies had increased during the Japanese occupation of Malaya and most of them had been turned into net-contributors to the Sterling Area (Hargreaves, 1996). While there was renewed all-party agreement in London on the importance of the colonies and the new Commonwealth, plans for a more interventionist approach opened up differences of opinion. The Hailey Report of 1942 recommended cultivating an African political class. Labour’s new Foreign Minister Bevin was as determined as the Conservatives to maintain Britain’s role as a great power alongside the USA and USSR – Lord Cadogan spoke of the Big Two and a Half (Reynolds, 1991) – but he was more prepared to collaborate with local political groups than his predecessors (Hargreaves, 1996). In Kenya the main debate was over whether to allow racially segregated white-dominated home-rule, as in South Africa, or to nurture African elites. In the Conservative government which followed Labour in the 1950s, Colonial Secretary Cranborne backed a racially based federation, but was opposed by Under-Secretary (and future prime minister) Macmillan. Independence was contemplated by very few until shortly before it happened.

From 1954, Asian and African representatives were accepted on the LegCo but at parity with the Europeans. Only 126,508 Africans were eligible to vote in the 1957 elections at which a majority of African seats were won by candidates opposed to this numerical discrimination, including Tom Mboya and Oginga Odinga, who together with Gichuru formed the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) in 1960. The remaining faction in Jomo Kenyatta’s Kenyan African Union re-formed themselves as the rival Kenyan African Democratic Union (KADU). Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd increased African representation, shortly before being replaced by Ian MacLeod in 1958. As late as 1959 a conference of East African governors concluded that independence was at least 15 years away. However, the anti-settler instincts of Macmillan, Macleod’s eagerness to avoid bloodshed of the kind raging in Belgian Congo, and De Gaulle’s sudden withdrawal from Algeria encouraged London to take a much shorter view than the colonial administrations. The Lancaster House Conference of 1960 rejected calls for black–white partition. Kenyatta, who had been detained on suspicion of Mau Mau sympathies, was released and took up the presidency of KANU. Two years later he was elected president of the new republic. It has been argued that more liberal elements on the British side eased the way to independence while locking the nationalists into neocolonial dependency, but Ogot (1995a) argues that there must also have been support from international business and even elements of the white settlers for this to have succeeded.

The Colonial Development and Welfare Acts had spurred an unprecedented growth of the white settler-dominated economy (Berman & Lonsdale, 1992). Labour injected £3 million into Kenyan agriculture, primarily helping the Europeans but also enabling some Africans to produce for the market. A further £7.95 million under the Swinnerton Plan was intended to support African cultivators and turn them away from the radical nationalism of the Mau Mau movement (Atieno-Odhiambo, 1995), which tended to be despised not only by Kenyans
who saw a future for themselves through Western modernisation, but also by Kikuyu elders who feared their authority was being usurped by the more nationalist younger generation (Atieno-Odhiambo, 1995). Writer Ngugi wa Thiong’o (1997) sees the Mau Mau as vigorous promoters of African languages, both oral and written, and contends that during the State of Emergency declared in 1952 to defeat them, elites operating in African languages were divided and fell behind those educated in English.

In general, English education in the 1950s was widely supported by Africans and indeed sought faster than the British thought wise (Hargreaves, 1996). Ngugi (1997) concludes that with vernacular instruction being dropped even from the first years of many primary schools, the educated generation emerging in postcolonial Kenya were heavily Anglicised. With the New Primary Approach adopted shortly before independence, English-medium primary schools increased from 14 in 1962 to 290 in 1963, and by 1966, 50% of primary schools were English-medium (Mazrui & Mazrui, 1998). In principle the local language remained the medium in rural areas, but even here a lack of vernacular resources often meant English was used instead.

**Language planning and education in Pakistan**

When Jinnah declared Urdu the national language of Pakistan, only 7.5% of the people in the West, and a mere 0.5% of those in the East, knew it as a first language (Weinstein, 1983). The first Education Conference’s 1947 proposals for free compulsory education were not implemented, and education had to compete with all other social sectors for just 4% of government expenditure. Urdu was to be a compulsory subject in all government schools. It was already the usual medium of instruction in Punjab, North West Frontier, Balochistan and Kashmir. The Sindhis preferred their vernacular, which had played a significant official role since the province was annexed by the British in the 1850s. But the influx of Mohajirs into Karachi saw Urdu schools there outnumbering Sindhi and Gujarati schools combined by 1950 (Rahman, 1999).

The main challenge to national language policy came from East Pakistan. Down to independence the Bengalis seem to have been solidly behind Urdu as a symbol of Muslim nationalism, but afterwards they found themselves geographically isolated from the government based in the western half of the country, and culturally marginalised despite comprising 54% of the population (Rahman, 1999). Jinnah’s insistence on the need for a single state language drew an angry response from his Dhaka audience in a 1948 speech. Urdu became a compulsory subject beyond class IV, while in Jessore and Kulna Urdu-medium classes were established for immigrants from West Pakistan and Bihar (Rahman, 1999). Experiments with teaching Bengali through the (Arabic) Nastaleeq script were especially unpopular. February 1952 saw the first of a series of increasingly violent demonstrations in favour of making Bengali a national language. It was finally installed as such alongside Urdu in the 1956 constitution, but this was not enough to remove other grievances which eventually led to the Bengalis’ secession in 1973.

A 1958 National Education Commission under Ayub Khan’s military regime (1958–69) urged the promotion of unity through Urdu, but since the civil and military bureaucracies were English-educated and in favour of social moderni-
sation, they sent out mixed messages. Rahman describes them as using Islam to prevent national disintegration, Urdu to contain regionalism, and English to check Islamisation (Rahman, 1999). Following the 1966 Homoodur Rahman Commission, even more English-medium civilian and cadet schools were opened. These received proportionately far greater state funding than vernacular education even though they were inaccessible to all but the wealthier classes. Under General Yahya Khan (1969–70) Air Marshal Nur Khan spoke out against the ‘barriers of privilege’ this system had created, yet his New Education Policy effectively did nothing to change things.

A more democratic language policy might have been expected from the civilian and potentially more liberal Bhutto governments (1970–7), and indeed Panjabi, Pashto and Balochi were allowed as elective classes in their respective regions. However, Bhutto was equally capable of using Islam and Urdu as symbols against ethnicism (Rahman, 1999), declaring Urdu the sole national language in the new constitution following Bangladesh’s secession. A return to military rule under Zia-ul-Haq from 1977 to 1988 produced what Rahman feels was a more genuine espousal of Urdu. Under the National Education Policy of 1979 English-medium instruction was to be phased out by teaching the first grade everywhere in Urdu or the regional language, giving teachers a five-year transition period to prepare for Urdu-medium secondary education. However, the move to Urdu medium was accompanied by more conservative and religious content, with Arabic becoming a compulsory subject. Zia’s successor, Bhutto’s daughter Benazir, proposed making English accessible to all, but again little was achieved. There is still a clear socioeconomic hierarchy of language with English at the top, Urdu next, and the regional languages below these.

Language planning and education in Malaysia

Asmah (1979) concludes that there were few objections in principle from non-Malay communities about making Malay the national language, bluntly describing the new constitution as a contract by which non-Malays received citizenship in return for recognising the cultural primacy of the Malays. Those under 45 had to show proficiency in Malay but no longer needed a local-born parent. Other conditions non-Malays have learned to live with include electoral (Milne & Mauzy, 1999), economic and educational biases in favour of bumiputra. Asmah (1979) nevertheless concedes that the process of making Malay official in reality required tough decisions in the face of potential opposition. The national language in Malaysia certainly has a more substantial presence than in Pakistan or Kenya, but it is difficult to determine whether this is because of the vigour with which language planning has been pursued or the head-start Malay had as the language of the largest and most stable community.

The 1957 constitution declared Malay the national language, gave special provision for the official use of English, and promised other languages an ‘equal opportunity to grow and develop’. It was Malay which received the most urgent attention. Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka was set up primarily to solve the lack of Malay teachers, and secondarily to standardise and modernise the language. Three years later the Talib Rahman Report decided that previous educational reforms had been too flexible in allowing Chinese secondary schools to continue. Given the choice of converting to Malay or English or losing government fund-
ing, most switched to English. The result was that by 1962, 90% of secondary students were in English-medium schools (Pennycook, 1994). To counter this an Education Act of 1961 proposed that Malay become the sole medium at secondary level. But the key legislation was the 1967 National Language Act, which came at the end of a 10-year period in which English was to be retained while methods of promoting Malay were worked out. It declared Malay the sole official language, with English the ‘second most important’ and to be retained as an alternative language for the legislature and courts. In order not to jeopardise educational standards (Asmah, 1979), English was retained as a compulsory subject, while Malay was to be staggered in over 26 years, starting by introducing Malay into English-medium secondary schools until they were fully converted. Government jobs and study grants were to require Malay proficiency, thus compelling (Asmah prefers winning over) non-Malays.

Mahathir (1986) has described this phase of education as a struggle in which the Malays were forced to cast aside English in order to uphold their own language. If there was a sense of struggle, its real point of departure was May 1969, when Chinese celebrations at the Alliance’s relatively poor performance in elections (48% of the vote but 66% of the seats) led to a Malay backlash and race riots which have shaped Malaysian politics ever since. Whether to ensure communal harmony or the hegemony of the Malays, the move towards Malay-medium education was accelerated. Discussion of potentially divisive issues, including language policy, was banned by a 1969 sedition bill attached to the constitution. A 1971 revision of the National Language Act confirmed the leading and secondary roles of Malay and English respectively. From 1973 all remaining English schools were to start converting to Malay in their arts stream, and the science stream followed suit from Form IV in 1976. The result of this policy by 1984 was a system of six-year Malay, Chinese and Tamil primary schools and five-year Malay secondary schools followed by an optional Form VI. In the 1980s all universities except the International Islamic University converted to Malay, although in 1993 the government increased provision for English-medium instruction in science, medicine, engineering and law.

Language planning and education in postcolonial Kenya

Ochieng’ and Atieno-Odhiambo (1995) contend that the new Kenyan state avoided social change by promoting the English-educated middle classes into key bureaucratic, military and educational posts vacated by the British. In 1963 Kenyatta gave a speech in Nakuru designed to reassure the Europeans and hold on to their capital and skills. Many were retained in government positions, such as Minister of Agriculture Brice MacKenzie (Ochieng’, 1995). Even the more radical Mboya concluded that there was ‘no point in change for its own sake’ (Ochieng’, 1995: 97). In 1967 there were still 1700 Britons in government service. In 1964, 97% of the legal profession and 95% of the doctors were Asian or European (Maxon, 1995). In some respects Kenya remained as when a colony. Nor was there any proclamation of a new national language on independence. Ochieng’ argues that there were in fact two transfers of power: from the British to the Anglicised nationalist elite on independence, and over the next few years from the nationalists to Kenyatta’s one-man show, with one chief rival, Odinga, resigning in 1966, while another, Mboya, was gunned down in 1969.
Kenya inherited an educational system that had segregated the races and favoured the Europeans with higher subsidies (Maxon, 1995). After 1963 European and Asian schools were opened to Africans, and the continued use of English had potential for removing ethnic divisions. Since they charged high fees, change in intake was slow. But few Europeans took citizenship, and many Britons were assisted by the British government to emigrate, most commonly to Australia and New Zealand. By 1978 the great majority of students at exclusive Nairobi School were African.

The Ominde Education Commission (1963–4) was in favour of free schooling, but maintained inherited elitism by prioritising resources for higher education in the hope of achieving rapid economic development. Between 1964 and 1979 the number of secondary schools increased eightfold, while primary schools only doubled, and Kenyatta and Nairobi Universities were established (Maxon, 1995). Over half of the secondary schools were new harambee schools (from Kenyatta’s 1963 call for the country to pull together by implementing community projects). Although a powerful example of public engagement, Maxon (1995) asserts that these unaided institutions achieved poor results because of untrained staff, inadequate facilities and over-academic curricula. A 1972 ILO report recommended more basic and vocational education, but public opinion was not swayed. Kenyans wanted access to higher education and to English because they saw it as the only means to higher employment. Witnesses on the Ominde Commission also expected English to produce national unity and progress quicker than other languages (Bokamba & Tlou, 1997). English was introduced as a subject from Standard I, and from 1965 there was British ODA for communicative English courses. In 1966 about half of Kenya’s primary schools were English medium (Mazrui & Mazrui, 1996); by 1970, the great majority of them (Maxon, 1995). However the Gachathi Report of 1976 recommended the vernacular for the first three years of schooling.

The postcolonial system thus more or less reinforced what had immediately preceded it. There were no ministerial-level commissions and no major reforms until 1985 under Kenyatta’s successor, Moi, when an 8–4–4 (eight years primary, four years secondary and four years higher) education structure was established emphasising the vernacular of the local area for the first four years, followed by English. More vocational courses have been introduced, and Kiswahili was made a compulsory examination subject from the first grade. While used as media, the vernaculars are almost never taught formally. Designation of ‘vernacular’ medium is up to local educators. About 18 are currently in use (Myers-Scotton, 1993) and in mixed-ethnic areas the vernacular may be Kiswahili or even English.

Vested Interests and Language Policies in Pakistan, Malaysia and Kenya

Investing in language

Discussions about language planning, particularly with regard to nation-building, often separate the integrative and instrumental functions of language. In the three polities under discussion, for example, it might be argued that the national language is promoted by those concerned with social and political inte-
igration, whereas English tends to be seen as having greater instrumental value for those seeking economic advancement. Kelman (1971: *Language as an aid and a barrier to involvement in the national system*, cited in Bruthiaux, 1992) sees people as sentimentally attached to systems they feel represent themselves, but instrumentally attached to those that help them achieve their ends. Influenced by Pierre Bourdieu’s work on how educational systems reproduce social inequalities, more recent debate has focused less on conscious motivation and more on the complex material, social and psychological investments people make in acquiring and using a language, thus combining the integrative and the instrumental. Norton (2000), for instance, argues that language learners bring with them an imagined community in which they want to invest part of their identity. Ability to learn and willingness to use a language may depend on what kind of community they associate with it.

The concept of language investment is particularly relevant to multilingual postcolonial nations where people appear to have a choice among several linguistic media, yet in reality find their choices constrained not only by financial resources but by the identities they and others associate with different languages. Individuals have various identities and commonly belong to a number of communities and speak different languages. But institutions tend to require a rationalisation of identity and of language, thus limiting the behaviour of those who depend on them. Having looked at the historical influences on language in Pakistan, Malaysia and Kenya, and at the languages currently in use, I want to turn to associations between language and to three institutions central to the identity of the imagined community that is called the nation-state.

**Language and bureaucracy**

In all three polities the postcolonial bureaucracy has been remarkably stable. In the case of Malaysia and Kenya this owes something to political stability – the long tenure of UMNO and KANU – while in Pakistan it owes more to political instability: the inability of civilian governments to make much impact on policy before being removed in military coups.

Jinnah chose to become governor-general rather than prime minister of Pakistan. Jalil (1998) sees this bypassing of party politics by using connections with the British as having disastrous consequences for the formation of the state in general and for education in particular, by focusing power not in electable political parties but in an unelected Anglicised and static bureaucracy. Six changes of government in the 1950s followed by Ayub Khan’s 1958 military coup further weakened the Muslim League and other parties.

Although generally English-educated, the bureaucratic class has used Urdu and Islam as symbols of national integration. This policy seems to promote the interests of the Punjabi and Mohajir elites to the detriment of the regions. Rahman (1998) contends that the attachment of these elites to English for their own benefit while promoting Urdu for the nation’s has produced a linguistic hierarchy with English at the top, Urdu in the middle and the regional languages at the bottom. Some governments, such as Zia’s, have favoured Urdu, and others, such as Benazir’s, English, and through these swings the latter has come to be associated with those who support liberal and Western values yet hang on to their elitist educational advantages, while the national language is increasingly
linked with religious authoritarianism. Bureaucrats and politicians who speak up for Urdu in public make sure in private that their children learn English (even General Zia, according to anecdote). Predominantly Urdu state education has such low esteem that there has been a huge expansion in private education, nearly all of it English-medium. This provides a way for the few to join the existing elite, leaving the many poorly educated and lacking proficiency in the language most highly valued by both the civilian and the military bureaucracies.

The Bengalis managed the most successful regional challenge to the linguistic status quo and are now politically independent. Next come the Sindhis, who had British support in their long history of promoting their language and have raised its status higher than that of other provincial tongues, yet find themselves squeezed between the more urban and economically dominant Mohajirs (Rahman, 1998) and the Punjabis who dominate the civilian and military bureaucracies. With the Pashto movement declining as the Pakhtuns integrate into the national power structure, Siraikis easily divided by selective co-opting from their Punjabi neighbours, and the Punjabis feeling they would lose rather than gain by asserting their identity, linguistic regionalism is kept in check by admonitions about national unity. Rahman sees that there is a stalemate ‘so interlinked with the distribution of power in Pakistan that it cannot change without bringing about unprecedented changes in the power structure’ (Rahman, 1998: 84). Genuinely promoting the national language would lead to a brain drain from the government and from Pakistan itself, less democracy, and opposition from some of the regions, especially Sindh. And so Urdu is paid lip-service while the elites continue to function in the colonial language.

In Malaysia the national language is clearly more favoured in the bureaucracy than is the case with Pakistan, it being the first language of most officials and increasingly the language in which they were educated. Indeed there are instances of inter-departmental correspondence being rejected because it was written in English (Asmah, 1996). Yet a ‘policy of having Malay as the official language seems to apply only to the written language of administration’ (Asmah, 1996: 521), not to conversation among bureaucrats. In Sarawak, a 1985 survey of the department of government which promotes the national language found an even balance between documentation in the two languages, with English favoured for contracts. Significantly, the amount of English seems to increase the higher the echelon, while the government offices listed as requiring most English from their staff include a number not especially concerned with international business, such as the Treasury, Prime Minister’s Office, and the Legal and Police departments.

In Kenya, Kikuyu associates of Kenyatta dominated the first 15 years of government, but although there was a common perception of ethnic favouritism regarding government posts and contracts, the same cannot be said for the Gikuyu language. Indeed Ng’gwa Thiong’o has chosen to write in his native Gikuyu as a protest against not only British neocolonialism but the authoritarianism of Kenya’s postcolonial governments. Kenyatta was well aware of the nationalising power of Kiswahili, ending his first parliamentary speech in it in 1964, and in 1969 publicly describing it as the national language. In 1974 he declared that ‘the basis of any independent government is a national language, and we can no longer continue aping our former colonisers’ (African Survey, 1974:
9, cited in Crystal, 1997: 14). KANU backed his plans to give Kiswahili oral priority in parliament, against the opposition of Attorney-General Njonjo (Mazrui & Mazrui, 1996). Minister of Information Robert Matano even threatened to fire bureaucrats lacking proficiency in the language. President Moi, from one of the smaller, non-Bantu groups (Tugen), restored English for debate in 1979.

There is a similar picture to Pakistan of English-educated politicians promoting the national language as a symbol of unity, with the bureaucracy firmly supporting English, and the vernaculars at the bottom of the pile. What is different is a greater access to English in education (which the Mazruis see as against national interests) and a political movement (KANU) which tends to favour the national language. Laitin (1992) has drawn analogies from game theory to show how English wins out in this equation, contending that it is not a battle of people’s first preferences which determines the outcomes, but an equilibrium of second and third choices made after calculating the likely choices of others. To summarise this game between the politicians and the civil servants, KANU favours Kiswahili as the sole language of politics or business, feeling this will help pull the nation behind them. Its second choice would be English for these functions, since unity is their priority, and its third choice would be Kiswahili for politics and English for administration. The bureaucrats’ first choice is English for everything, not only because they were educated in it but because they see it as a more efficient channel for resources, including international aid. Next they would allow Kiswahili for politics but keep English for administration, since they prioritise efficiency. Their third choice would be KANU’s first choice. Thus English and unity, the bureaucrats’ first choice and KANU’s second, win out, but the politicians sweeten their loss by symbolic use of Kiswahili. In education another player – the parents – is added, and in a different way, English again wins out.

Laitin argues that the colonial language holds the winning hand in many multilingual states because postcolonial ‘rulers may have a greater need to construct states . . . than to build nations . . . These rulers use the symbols of a nation, but their interests are oriented more towards the construction of organisations capable of maintaining order in society and extracting resources from society’ (Laitin, 1992).

Language and the security forces

After Oxford and Cambridge, Sandhurst was one of the most important educational institutions for the colonised elites, producing, among others, Ayub Khan. Military links with Britain survived decolonisation in Pakistan, Malaysia and Kenya, although today connections with the United States are more important. Although there were all-Hindu and all-Sikh units in the Indian army, the British kept the Muslims divided, probably because of distrust following the uprising of 1856–7 (Cohen, 1998). This may help to explain the dominance of English in Pakistan’s army to this day, even though it draws heavily on Punjabi recruits in all ranks, but is probably less significant than Pakistan’s close ties to the United States since the 1950s, encouraged by India’s courting of the Soviet Union. According to a staff member of Pakistan’s Military Academy, English is the prime means of educating and disciplining trainee officers who may come from all over the country and do not necessarily bring an education in English
with them. There is anecdotal evidence of a high-ranking military attaché quite adept at communicating with his British and American counterparts but needing an interpreter to negotiate with Urdu-speakers (Husain et al., 2000).

The military in Malaysia plays a much less prominent role than in Pakistan and is relatively small. There have been no coups. Britain’s military presence continued for several years after independence because of the insurgency, and according to Milne and Mauzy (1999) British non-political traditions persist. At the same time military leaders have had personal or family links with all of the country’s prime ministers. As with the federal police, entrants at all ranks need a school-leaving pass in both Malay and English, and there are English language officers providing in-service training. But although Malay is the dominant language, as in the civilian bureaucracy use of English is greater at the higher levels, and as noted above, the security forces are ranked among government departments where English is relatively important (Asmah, 1996).

The national language is a significant instrument of unity in the Kenyan army and police (Mazrui & Mazrui, 1998), particularly in the lower ranks where it was promoted by the British. Police recruitment takes place on both a national and a local level, and English is more likely to be required for the former, Kiswahili for the latter. Despite a failed airforce coup in 1982 the military has kept a low profile compared with Kenya’s neighbours. In Uganda, Kiswahili was not only promoted by General Amin, but was the language of the Tanzanian army which overthrew him, and also the lingua franca of the multiethnic but mostly Nilotic-speaking northerners who overthrew Obote in 1985.

Language and the judiciary

In all three countries the legal system is the national institution in which English is most firmly entrenched. There seem to be linguistic, juridical and political reasons for its position.

Language planning and legal reform seem always to have been closely associated by British colonial administrations. One of Warren Hastings’ motivations for Oriental study was to show the existence of fixed bodies of Hindu and Muslim law in order to oppose a parliamentary committee seeking to substitute English law for what it saw as despotism (Cohn, 1996). William Jones developed his theories about the connection between Indian and European languages while serving as a judge. Both would have abhorred the 1864 reform of the Indian judicial system, which ended a long tradition of searching out local precedents and employing local officials by bringing in English case law. Based on a tradition of building up law through concrete precedents, it is probably reasonable to say that the English legal tradition is more resistant than most to wholesale reorganisation, and that applies to its use of language as well. There is little confidence that law can be written without ambiguity, and so a corpus of interpretations applied in specific cases has generally been preferred to statutory codification. Even in modern Pakistan, Malaysia and Kenya there may still be reference to English cases, and so it would be difficult for lawyers to dispense with high proficiency in English without a revolution in the legal system. Despite the appearance of shariah law alongside the existing tradition in Pakistan and Malaysia, and an increased sense in the latter of law’s potential ‘as an instrument of state power’ (Anwarul, 1996: 57) decolonisation occurred without such a revolution.
The constitutions of all three countries were written in English before any other language, and most other laws are produced in the same way. Many laws (Gunn, 1997, cites censorship and sedition provisions in Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei) have direct antecedents in the colonial era and may simply have been left on the statutes. Malaysia’s 1967 Language Bill singles out the legal system for a slower phasing out of the colonial language than elsewhere (Asmah, 1979). According to article 152 of the Malaysian constitution the Supreme Court conducts affairs in English unless counsel agree that it is not necessary (Asmah, 1996). The commercial courts are also conducted and recorded in English (Fishman, 1996b) and although recent press releases have raised the issue of insisting on contracts in Malay in order to avoid deception (Straits Times, 22 February 2000), it is unlikely to happen soon.

Pakistan, Malaysia and Kenya all make provision for court proceedings to be held in or translated into a language understood by participants. In Kenya, for instance, 92% of the discussion in the Primary courts, and 79% in the District courts, is in Kiswahili (but only 28% in the High Court), and there has been a concerted effort since the 1960s to create new legal terms in the national language (Yahya-Othman & Batibo, 1996). However, the legal profession itself remains heavily Anglicised, with legal training in all three predominantly in English. The University of Malaya, for example, has had a faculty of law since the 1970s, whose entrants require a high attainment in English (Asmah, 1996). Nevertheless those who can afford it go to London to take their exams. There is a certain amount of exchange in legal personnel, as well as cases, across common law countries. Four out of Kenya’s seven Chief Justices have been foreign-born. Some have argued this makes them better able to stand up to political interference, although Mazrui and Mazrui assert that there is no shortage of expatriate judges in Africa who have ‘routinely acted as if they were an extension of the executive branch’ (Mazrui & Mazrui, 1998: 113). They conclude that most Kenyans feel alienated from a judicial system that is ‘based on the assumption that many of the most senior judges might be completely illiterate in Kiswahili’ (Mazrui & Mazrui, 1998: 111).

Overview of Current Language Use in Former British Dependencies

Difficulties in establishing criteria for comparison

To broaden the discussion to the position of official languages in former British colonies in general, in Table 1 I have set recent figures for English language use and status alongside some basic economic, educational and political data. The primary focus is thus on the position of English, and the main intention is to suggest patterns of linguistic dominance among polities of various economic and cultural hues, but also to emphasise how difficult it is to draw any firm conclusions.

Identifying a language presents not merely practical, but conceptual problems. Myers-Scotton (1993), for example, contrasts the case of Acholi and Lango in Uganda with that of Chaga in Tanzania. Mutually intelligible, the first two are classified as separate languages because of their different histories, whereas mutually unintelligible Chaga ‘dialects’ are grouped as one language. Various
pockets of Shina speakers in northern Pakistan had no sense of linguistic identity with each other until British administrators decided to classify them together (Rahman, 1998). And in Sabah administrative preference for separating Kadazan and Dusun has ebbed and flowed for a variety of political reasons (Nomura, 2001: personal communication). It might be thought that identifying English, which is the main focus of this section, would be more straightforward. But how should ‘standard’ and ‘non-standard’ varieties sit with creoles and pidgins?

Even where it is more or less possible to isolate languages for classification, the intense multilingualism of most former colonies means it is vital to avoid an ‘either English or vernacular’ approach to the figures. Myers-Scotton (1993) asserts that everyone who is mobile in Kenya is bilingual, and Mazrui and Mazrui conclude that Laitin’s ‘3 ± 1’ formula is as applicable to Kenya and most of Africa as it is to highly multilingual India. They add that this multilingual environment is ‘still fluid and complex as the social dynamics force the different languages to encroach upon each other’s territory’ (Mazrui & Mazrui, 1998:139).

Particularly problematic is codeswitching, which is of crucial importance in postcolonial societies where national and local languages compete for status with the colonial tongue. David (1999) has referred to codeswitching as a distinct language choice, so entrenched in Malaysian society that it constitutes a language in itself. Her research shows that it most commonly involves mixing Malay and English (with the percentage of the latter rising in proportion to economic context), but may involve three or more languages. In a society described as the most status-conscious out of a sociolinguistic survey of 30 countries (Hofstede, 1986) codeswitching has crucial implications not only for linguistic conduct but for the gathering of linguistic data. Haugerud (1995) has shown similarly complex patterns of codeswitching between English, Kiswahili and local languages in her study of public meetings in Kenya. Hassan (2000) has identified five versions of Pakistani English with speakers switching among more and less Urduised registers as well as into more and less Anglicised varieties of Urdu.

Furthermore, there are no definitive references for language use. Much of the information below is from Crystal (1997, 2000), who admits trawling and extrapolating from sources as diverse as the UNESCO Statistical Yearbook and Encyclopaedia Britannica. Whitely (1984, cited in Kayambazinatu, 1999) argues that censuses tend to work by ethnic rather than linguistic categories (although Cohn’s (1996) work suggests that British surveys in India tended to prioritise linguistic categories because they were thought more reliable than ethnicity). To these analytical difficulties must be added the bias in using polity-level data. The territories in the first column are most of those which have gained independence from British rule since 1945. They thus coincide with full Commonwealth members excluding those with longer histories of home rule by European settlers, such as Canada, and some smaller remaining dependencies such as Anguilla (population 7000). Myanmar and some other former colonies outside the Commonwealth have been included.

The second column refers to language status. The term ‘official’ tends to imply some institutionalisation, such as mention in the constitution or importance in internal government administration. Because of blurring between de jure and de
official status I have included some differences of opinion, but the distinction between the two is not academic. The former suggests authorities have perceived a need to formalise the status of a language in the face of some kind of uncertainty. \footnote{I isolate national as a special categorisation of official language which tends to reflect a history of debate about national identity and is often an attempt to limit the status of the former colonial language. Kaplan (1998) has also argued that the designation implies the dominance of one language, as opposed to competition among several official (or, for that matter, non-official) languages. While the dominance of the national language may be real in Malaysia, however, it is more symbolic in Pakistan and Kenya, and merely rhetorical in Singapore. Mazrui and Mazrui (1995) suggest that a national language usually has a close association with one polity only. If so this makes Pakistan, Malaysia and Kenya interesting exceptions. In contrast Calvet (1998) feels the more transnational a language, the greater its chance of acquiring national status in Africa.}

The third column takes up dominance and competition more directly, but with reference to English only. The concept of language competition is itself a controversial one. It is a fundamental problem of language planning that multilingualism sits more comfortably in some individuals than others. The series editors’ view is that ‘for the individual bilingual, languages co-exist in his/ her repertoire, but for the multilingual society, languages do in fact compete for registers, for power, for acceptability, for social status’ (Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997: 236). Moreover, the author of the typology I have borrowed admits himself that its usefulness is limited by the difficulties of comparing the various dialects, creoles, hybrids and standardisations which go by the name of English (McArthur, 1998).

The fourth column, concerning degree of language use, involves even greater conceptual difficulty. For a start, use is not always clearly distinguishable from status. Some exaggeration can be expected for higher-status languages (e.g. Mazrui & Mazrui, 1998). Furthermore, first, second and foreign language are fluid terms. In this paper I have readily favoured L1, or first language, over mother tongue, because of doubts as to the latter’s usefulness. I am less confident about distinguishing between L1 and L2. Some linguists feel the latter should be discarded altogether. I have kept it because of its currency in historical-political and pedagogical debate, and to draw a distinction with foreign language. But I accept that it is a blunt tool. According to Crystal’s figures, for example, 50% of Nigerians claim proficiency in English as a second language: this seems to cover both school-acquired proficiency in a general Nigerian variety of English and first-language proficiency in English-based creoles which many non-Nigerians would find difficult to understand.

**The current position of English in former British colonies**

Bearing these difficulties in mind, there may yet be some value in setting the basic linguistic data of former British colonies alongside each other as in Table 1. A first glance suggests that the status of English outstrips its dominance, and that this in turn is weightier than what might be expected from the degree of use. English has some kind of official status in all but a handful of polities, yet in only a quarter do the number of L1 speakers exceed 10% or the number of L2 speakers exceed 30%.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Dominance</th>
<th>Degree of use</th>
<th>Literacy (%)</th>
<th>School free or compulsory</th>
<th>GNP ($ per cap)</th>
<th>Independence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antigua &amp; Barbuda</td>
<td>de facto official</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>L1:3%, L2:97% +creole</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
<td>7330 (GDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>official</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>L1:90</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>11940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>recognised for law &amp; higher education</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>L2:2.5%</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>(not c)</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>official</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>L1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>official</td>
<td>A2</td>
<td>L1:60% 2:13% creole 50%</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>1yf, 2yc</td>
<td>2700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bermuda</td>
<td>de facto official</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>L1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>official with Setswana</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>L2:30%</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>1+2y f</td>
<td>2800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>official (with Malay)</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>L1:3%, L2:30%</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1+2y f</td>
<td>25160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>official with French</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>L2:50% (50% use pidgin)</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cayman Is</td>
<td>official</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>L1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook Is</td>
<td>official</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>L1:5%, L2:10%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>official</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>L1:4%, L2:16%</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
<td>3090</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1 (contd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Dominance</th>
<th>Degree of use</th>
<th>Literacy (%)</th>
<th>School free or compulsory</th>
<th>GNP ($ per cap)</th>
<th>Independence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>official with Fijian</td>
<td>B L2:20%</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>not c</td>
<td>2470</td>
<td>1970 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>official [with 4 others]</td>
<td>B L2:3% creole as LF</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1y f, (not c)</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>official</td>
<td>B L2:7%</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1+2y f</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gibraltar</td>
<td>official with Spanish</td>
<td>A2 L1:90%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UK dependency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>official</td>
<td>A1 L1</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>1+2 fc</td>
<td>2880</td>
<td>1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>official</td>
<td>A1 L1:90%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>690</td>
<td>1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>official with Cantonese</td>
<td>B L1:2%, L2:30%</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1+2y fc</td>
<td></td>
<td>Special Administrative Region of China, 1997.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>associate official after Hindi (national), with others; state language of some territories and states</td>
<td>B L2:3%</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1y f</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>official</td>
<td>A1 L1</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>1y f</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>formerly official; now official 2nd after Swahili (national); [official with 5 others]</td>
<td>B L2:10%</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
<td>320</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Dominance</td>
<td>Degree of use</td>
<td>Literacy (%)</td>
<td>School free or compulsory</td>
<td>GNP ($ per cap)</td>
<td>Independence</td>
</tr>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>L2:25%</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
<td>920</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>L2:23%</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
<td>660</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>L2:5%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td>180</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>L1: &lt; 2%, L2:30%</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
<td>4370</td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>B</td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>1080</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>L2:20%</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>1+2 fc</td>
<td>8712</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>L2:15%</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>1y f</td>
<td>3710</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1+2y f</td>
<td>2610</td>
<td>1948 NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>50% English or creole as L2</td>
<td>25+</td>
<td>1y f</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>L2:11%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1y fc</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>1947 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>L1:3%, L2:?</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td>1150</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Dominance</td>
<td>Degree of use</td>
<td>Literacy (%)</td>
<td>School free or compulsory</td>
<td>GNP ($ per cap)</td>
<td>Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Christopher (Kitts) and Nevis</td>
<td>official (ii)</td>
<td>A1 L1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5870</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Lucia</td>
<td>official</td>
<td>A1 L1:20%, L2:15%, +F-E creole</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1y fc</td>
<td>3500</td>
<td>1979 (internal autonomy 1967)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Vincent/Grenadines</td>
<td>official</td>
<td>A1 L1</td>
<td>82</td>
<td></td>
<td>2370</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>official with French, creole</td>
<td>B L1:2.5%, L2:15%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6850</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>official</td>
<td>B L1:10%, L2:85%, creole is LF</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1y partly f not c</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>official with Chinese, Malay (the national language) &amp; Tamil; medium of instruction of all state education (iii)</td>
<td>A2 L1:10%, L2:30%</td>
<td>87</td>
<td></td>
<td>30550</td>
<td>1965 (self-governing within Malay Fed 1959)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Is</td>
<td>official with Pidgin</td>
<td>B L2:35%</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td>900</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1956 NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>formerly official; wide govt use</td>
<td>B L2:10%</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>1+2+3 f</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>official (with Siswati)</td>
<td>B L2:4%</td>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
<td>1210</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Dominance</td>
<td>Breakdown</td>
<td>Degree of use</td>
<td>Literacy (%)</td>
<td>GNP ($ per cap)</td>
<td>School free or compulsory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>main medium of secondary education; former official</td>
<td>L2:10%</td>
<td>1+2 fc</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Tongan</td>
<td>L2:30%</td>
<td>90+</td>
<td>1790</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>official with</td>
<td>L1</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>3870</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>official with</td>
<td>L2:7%</td>
<td>&gt; 50</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>official with</td>
<td>L2:10% (Swahili main L); L2:7% (English main L)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1290</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>official with</td>
<td>L2:10% (French &amp; Bislama French); L2:10% (English &amp; Bislama Creole)</td>
<td>&gt; 20</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>1967 (Aden: unification with N Yemen 1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>official</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>76</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>official</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>official</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 (cont.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Dominance</th>
<th>Degree of use</th>
<th>Literacy (%)</th>
<th>School free or compulsory</th>
<th>GNP ($ per cap)</th>
<th>Independence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Based mostly on McArthur; additions in parenthesis are from Kaplan and Baldauf and may vary from McArthur.</td>
<td>Based mostly on McArthur A1 = no major competition. A2 = alongside widely used languages B = used by many as 2nd language, often with special role in education, govt. etc. C = foreign language</td>
<td>%s are rough calculations based on figures in Crystal, 2000. L1 = native level, L2 = second language. L1 under 1% not recorded. LF = lingua franca between some groups within country. Creole data mainly from ITN.</td>
<td>source ITN 1991</td>
<td>source ITN 1991 f = free c = compulsory 1y = thru elementary; 2y = at least some secondary</td>
<td>from Crystal (2000).</td>
<td>NC = not a member of the Commonwealth. * = membership suspended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some dependent territories with population under 30,000 have been omitted.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

(i) Kayamba-zinthu.
(iii) Mangayer Karasi
Here we should take note of Crystal’s (1997) comment that the importance of a language has much less to do with the number of speakers than with who those speakers are.

**Breakdown by status and dominance**

Given the inherent randomness of a ‘naturally occurring complex system’ (Hall, 2000) like language, any attempt to isolate moncausal factors amounts only to conjecture. The degree of randomness is even greater in a general overview like this one. But it would be dull to go no further than state that each language community is the product of a unique social matrix. I have speculatively regrouped some of the information from Table 1 to see what possible patterns emerge.

Only in Cyprus, the Maldives, Myanmar, Sudan and Yemen is English without even *de facto* official status. All five have a dominant national language (Greek and Turkish respectively in the two halves of Cyprus), although the political centres of Sudan and Myanmar are bogged down in military conflicts with ethnolinguistically distinct regions. In the last three, English can be considered a foreign language, but has (arguably) more domestic standing in the first two. The last three can be said to have made concerted efforts to distance themselves from their colonial past—through nationalistic forms of socialism and also, in the case of two of them, Islam. Significantly, they are the only non-Commonwealth countries in the table. Sudan is often mentioned (e.g. Mazrui & Mazrui, 1998) as a rare example of somewhere English has lost ground.

One plausible pattern emerges after isolating those polities which grant English qualified official status (Table 2). These have recognised the importance of English but consciously sought at some stage to subordinate it to the national language.

Each of the above has a particularly rich history of language planning debate. The long civil war in Sri Lanka, for example, can be traced to Solomon Bandaranaike’s 1956 proclamation of Sinhala as official language. Bangladesh is unusual in this category in that over 90% of its population share the same L1. However, mobilisation behind Bangla can be explained by the struggle to install it as the official language during two decades of rule from pro-Urdu Karachi and Islamabad.

Noss (1986) has suggested that national planners are more likely to view English as potentially disruptive in societies where there are sizeable minorities whose language (and also religion) are quite different from the national language community. The theory would help to explain ambivalent feelings toward English in India, Malaysia and Sri Lanka. On the other side of this coin is a view that in the absence of such minorities it is a language close to the national one which is likely to be seen as a threat. But this does not seem to hold good for the position of Punjabi in Pakistan or Gikuyu in Kenya.

**Breakdown by degree of use**

Eleven of the polities are more than 90% L1 English-speaking. Of these all but Gibraltar are Caribbean societies resulting from a colonial-driven displacement of population that effectively wiped out the indigenous inhabitants. Most of the first immigrants were forcibly severed from their cultural origins in various parts
of multilingual West Africa, so it is little surprise that the colonial language became the lingua franca. It is more remarkable to what extent African lexis and structures have survived during centuries of contact with European languages in English-based creoles, usually existing diglossically alongside local varieties of English. In several other polities, extensive use of a creole seems to be associated with a high degree of English as L2 – notably Antigua and Barbuda, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Vanuatu. On the other hand, the use of creole far outstrips that of English in Gambia.

**Breakdown by geographical location**

Britain’s extensive colonial activities were concentrated in five zones across the globe: the Caribbean; sub-Saharan Africa (clustered in the west, east and south of the continent); Asia (the Subcontinent and Malaya); small but strategically vital posts in the Mediterranean; and the southern Pacific. By grouping the polities according to region in Table 3, some patterns emerge.

English seems to be most dominant in the Caribbean group, where it has official status and is the main language or one of the main languages in every case. Clearly it is also very important in Africa, where its has official status in all of the sub-Saharan polities targeted. Indeed, Mazrui and Mazrui (1998) point out that there is no example of an African elected to the presidency of a sub-Saharan nation who could not speak the former colonial language, and in some cases, such as Malawi’s Hastings Banda, they functioned only in that language.

**Table 2** Official and educational position of English where it has ‘qualified official status’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Status of English</th>
<th>Medium of instruction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Recognised in law and education systems</td>
<td>Common in higher education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Officially subordinate to Hindi, the national language. One of 16 languages recognised in the constitution</td>
<td>Common at higher levels, and at secondary schools in regions where Hindi is not widely spoken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Once official, now an official 2nd language after the national language, Kiswahili</td>
<td>The medium in most institutions beyond Standard IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Formerly official, now the ‘second most important’ language</td>
<td>A compulsory school subject. Common use as medium at higher level and in some secondary schoolssubjects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Officially subordinate to Urdu, but the main language of government</td>
<td>Common at higher level and the medium of nearly all private secondary schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Once official; continued wide use (10% of population) especially in government</td>
<td>Common in higher education and in some secondary schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Once official. Kiswahili now occupies most government domains</td>
<td>The main medium of secondary education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antigua/Bar</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Brunei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caymans</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>Maldives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Kitts</td>
<td>S. Leone</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Lucia</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Vince/Gr</td>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad/To</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>(official); B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>co-official+4;B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>official; B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>official; B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: co-ff = one other official language; official+2 etc. = two etc. others; (official) = qualified official status
There seem to be three distinct African patterns, however: highly multilingual countries where the colonial language is the only officially installed lingua franca (Cameroon is an interesting variation where two colonial languages are the official ones); those where it is co-official with one autochthonous majority language (mostly in the south); and those where it is official with several others.

The survival of autochthonous languages, alongside the colonial tongue, is apparent in the relatively isolated communities of the Pacific. In every case English is co-official with, but less widely used than, a local lingua franca except in Vanuatu, where there are two other officially recognised languages, and the Cooks, where the majority Cook Islands Maori lacks official status. It should be noted, however, that the lack of official status for Indian lingua francae in Fiji reflects the political rather than numerical dominance of the autochthonous community.

The Asian countries show greatest diversity, but it is notable that English is sole official language in none of them, lacks official standing in three, and has only qualified standing in another three. Only India and Singapore recognise more than two official languages. In the others one national language (with or without English) appears dominant, at least on the surface.

The limits of English penetration

Despite centuries of colonial domination, English has saturated deep down into very few societies except for the Caribbean and Sierra Leone, with their largely resettled populations. In most cases it is nevertheless a high status (often the only high status) language, and maintains an entrenched elitist position. English appears to have higher standing in former African than in Asian colonies, but also a greater penetration. The large numbers of L2 speakers in highly multilingual societies like Cameroon, Nigeria and Zimbabwe that lack a dominant local language lend some support to the view that it is considered pragmatically ‘neutral’. In Asia there seems to be more momentum behind the national language, but here it may be relevant to note Noss’s (1986) comment that in South East Asia a diminishing official status for English often masks its growing importance in a number of other domains.

It may be that there is more English in societies with greater penetration of international business activity. But even though it can be concluded that there is more English in international Singapore than in parochial Myanmar, this does not say anything more about former British colonies than about non-colonies. Moreover it would be wrong to insist that less English means less international contact. In a number of polities in Table 1 there is extensive use of an international language other than English: Sudan and Yemen (and to a lesser degree, Malaysia and Pakistan) are linked through language, as well as religion, with the Arab world, while Cameroon, the Seychelles, St Lucia and Vanuatu have access to the Francophone. Nearly all Malaysians and Bruneians have Malay in common with each other and with Indonesians. Significant numbers in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda and other parts of eastern and southern Africa can converse in Swahili. Hindu-Urdu is used by millions of Indians and Pakistanis. Moreover, several varieties of Chinese are common to large communities in Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore as well as to the Chinese diaspora spread throughout the world. Some languages with official status in only one polity spill across borders, such
as Malawi’s Chichewa (Kayambazinthu, 1999). As Calvet (1998) notes, there is a tendency to think of international languages as the (European) colonial ones while referring to cross-border non-European languages as mere lingua francae.

Postcolonial Discourses and Debates on Language

Postcolonial development and multilingualism

The management of postcolonial development through multilingualism has produced rich and heated debates among politicians, economists, educators and linguists in both the ‘developed’ and the ‘developing’ world. Here there is only space to summarise some of the discussions (in English) most relevant to the relationship between the three polities under focus and their colonial past. Together they show that the relation between language preference and sociopolitical stance is complex and indirect. People have various reasons for using and supporting a particular language. For instance, the strongest critics of the spread of English include some of its native speakers – although it is often a case of non-subalterns speaking on behalf of the subalterns without noticing that the latter have started to speak for themselves. Just as 19th-century Orientalists and Anglicists represented a range of positions within a generally pro-colonial paradigm, proponents of international, national and vernacular languages cover the whole spectrum of opinion about postcolonialism.

Which medium of instruction?

Colonialism did not seek or achieve the degree of linguistic rationalisation which has been carried out within most of the colonial powers themselves, and most former British colonies are highly multilingual. The choice of medium of instruction in education is thus as central to postcolonial as it was to colonial language planning. From a linguistic point of view it is difficult to find reliable evidence on which to base arguments for or against the importance of education in the first language since the variables (students, teachers, materials, goals, supporting community) vary widely (Dua, 1990). It may be that children are more likely to achieve literacy through their first language, but motivation may be more important than medium for other skills. It is often held (e.g. Bokamba & Tlou, 1997) that educational standards in all subjects improve when instruction shifts to L1. Conversely, Gagné (2000) has shown how immersion programmes in a second language backed by the resources of a developed country can improve results in subjects taught through that language, as well as in the language itself. Skuttnab-Kangas (1999) feels that education through a second language (typically for instrumental reasons) need not be a problem for ethnic majority groups, although it is a different matter for minorities.

Since language planning nearly always has non-linguistic aims (Cooper, 1989), and language change is usually a translation of deeper social movements (Calvet, 1998), it probably makes sense to consider medium of instruction controversies from a sociopolitical rather than linguistic perspective. Cooper (1989) suggests the Ford Foundation’s influential support for L1 may have been simplistic in assuming this is what parents themselves want. Governments in Pakistan, Malaysia and Kenya currently all profess to support the principle of first-language instruction, at least at early primary level, but parents do not
always agree. Increasing numbers of Indian Malaysians, for instance, including many educators, fear that instruction in Tamil may ghettoise them in a nation which supplies few jobs in that language (Kalimuthu, 1983) and doesn’t even support secondary education in it.

Desai (2000) feels that marginalisation and inadequate teaching materials in Africa can be overcome by planning as long as parents are shown that vernacular instruction need not stop their children from learning an economically powerful language well enough to get work in it. This raises the fundamental question of whether languages can be learned additively rather than subtractively. Calvet argues that ‘any spread of language is always to the detriment of other languages’ (Calvet, 1998: 98), going on to assert that the only people who pretend all languages are equal are linguists. Eastman (1993) criticises Laponce’s (1984) likening of languages to competing animals as coming from political science, not linguistics, yet here again sociopolitical factors seem to be more relevant than pedagogical opinion. Asmah (1979) believes that it is idealistic to think a system can support more than one language equally, citing the case of Singapore, which went over to English instruction out of fears of falling literacy, and adding that Malay was bound to lose out if English had been retained alongside it because of its perceived value for more prestigious subjects like science. Kaplan and Baldauf (1997) conclude that although languages may coexist for the individual bilingual, in multilingual societies they do in fact compete for registers, power and status.

Is the education system failing English, or vice versa?

In all three polities in focus there is a general perception that English standards have been falling. Hassan (2000) returned to Pakistan after 20 years with the impression that all the teacher training and workshops which had developed in his absence had achieved nothing, and speculates that this has something to do with government fears of innovation and increased tendency to teach one kind of English (Pakistani) while evaluating according to the standards of another. Egerton University’s Japheth Kiptoo feels that falling standards in English are jeopardising all other subjects in Kenya (Mazrui & Mazrui, 1996). Meanwhile in Malaysia, despite its comparatively high funding for education, the University of Malaysia’s medical degree is no longer recognised by the UK General Medical Council, partly because of falling standards in English. (Asmah, 1996). Assessing secondary students during the transition period from English to Malay-medium schooling, Mariam (1983) found a considerable difference in English proficiency between products of the two streams, while Azalina’s (1998) more recent study of trainee teachers in Sarawak found very low instrumental motivation for English beyond the requirements of a compulsory basic proficiency course, and even less integrative motivation: few had English-speaking friends or were interested in English culture. In a recent letter to The Straits Times (28 March 2001) a Tamil mother complained that her child was not getting the multicultural education in a National (i.e. Malay-medium) school that she herself had received in an English-medium one because the Chinese are deserting them in frustration at not having enough study hours in their own vernacular.

The debate about English proficiency in Malaysia extends to the question of whether it is now a second or a foreign language. The discussion is partly peda-
gogical: Ministry of Education guidelines lay down that the language is to be taught by using the target language only (David, 1999), which continues to be the orthodox approach to EFL in much of the world but is especially emphasised in ESL. But the issue also has to do with Malaysia’s identity in South East Asian between the ESL (Philippines, Singapore) and EFL (Thailand, Indonesia) zones. Furthermore, it is incumbent on language-planning authorities to show that the highly successful development of the national language has not been at the expense of proficiency in English. Meanwhile creative writing in English is declining (Pennycook, 1994), in contrast to the wealth of Kenyan English literature (Ogot, 1995) – which Ngugi (1997) dismisses as Afro-Saxon. Asmah (1996) has gone to considerable lengths to argue that English has not become a foreign language, citing its status as a compulsory subject and medium in some tertiary areas, its diffusion across different ethnic groups, and its prevalence in the media and in inter- and even intra-ethnic social exchange in support of her argument. It should be noted here that while Malaysia is increasingly an exporter of English language services to other Asian countries (Graddol, 1997), it also provides the largest number of non-EU entrants to undergraduate courses in the UK (HESA, 1995).

Many Malaysians (e.g. Choy, 1986) feel that a fall in English was inevitable during the period in which the national language was most in need of promotion, but that it is time for the pendulum to swing back. In 1985 hours of English instruction at secondary school were increased (Kalaverny, 1986). But President of the Malaysian Linguistics Society Nik Safiah Karim wonders why English should be compulsory at all when only 5–10% of the population need it, echoing a question from Abbass Husain et al. (2000) about plans to introduce English from Grade I (Issani, 2000) for children who will nearly all have finished school by Grade V. One difficulty with measuring whether proficiency has in fact fallen is that in all three countries there are far more in school now than there were in colonial times. It may be that the number highly proficient in English has been stable, but those who are less proficient stand out more now.

In Pakistan and Kenya there is discussion not only about the value of English, but of the mass state education system altogether – which Tollefson (1991) has described as inequality in the name of equality. Hoodbhoy (1998) cites a report in Pakistan which found that primary-age children not attending school did better at arithmetical tasks than those in school, and argues that the Ministry of Education aims not for a curriculum which will raise standards but one in which children will not be given any ideas. Kardar (1998) considers Pakistan’s funding of education pitiful even by developing country standards, while Bergman and Mohammad (1998) note that pay and status in the state schools are so low that absenteeism among teachers is as bad as among pupils.

Kiswahili comes a distant second to English in the Kenyan educational system, but Mazrui and Mazrui (1998) argue that while education is important when a language is needed for vertical integration between rulers and ruled – as in the elitist colonial system, and perhaps also in post-independence Tanzania – it is often bypassed in the process of horizontal integration between different ethnic groups. This is where they see Kiswahili’s role as crucial. They contrast well-educated rural ‘misfits’, who migrate to cities where they can function in English, with equally ambitious but less educated mass migrants who adjust to
urban life by acquiring and using the national language. It is also worth noting that Kenya has promoted vocational instruction, even at secondary level, more than most Commonwealth countries (King, 1996), widening the debate about the practicality of English into one about the practicality of education in general.

Does nation-building demand language rationalisation?

Whilst Pakistan, Malaysia and Kenya all tolerate varying degrees of multilingualism, each state has evolved the concept of one national language. Urdu brings with it religious authority, as well as the linguistic justification of being fairly familiar to many of Pakistan’s other language-speakers; Malay carries the history of being the lingua franca and the force of the largest ethnic community behind it; and Kiswahili combines ease of acquisition for the Bantu majority with the advantage of having few native speakers nationally but considerable vehicularity internationally. Another reason for supporting these languages is that they are not the colonial language. And since the British were not usually too concerned about linguistic rationalisation as long as business ran efficiently, it might be speculated that a desire to run things differently from the colonials gave added incentive to raising up a single language, even if only symbolically.

In principle this congruence between nation and language is not disputed. In Malaysia even the Chinese-dominated Democratic Action Party (DAP) unconditionally accepts Malay as a factor for unification as long as it does not become an instrument for destroying other languages (Asmah, 1979). In Kenya a poll by Africa Survey 10 years after independence found that 74% of the population accepted Kiswahili as the national tongue, even while ‘retribalisation’ was increasing in response to state Kikuyu favouritism (Maloba, 1995). In Pakistan since the secession of Bangladesh, regional language movements seem to be weakening except in Sindh, even though regional identity has become more important as alienation from the state grows. However, since state espousal of the unitary concept is motivated by integrative and developmental aims that may not be compatible, national language planning is often more symbolic than substantial. When it goes beyond this, the consensus behind it wavers. Shamsul (1998) suggests that the whole concept of kebangsaan (nationhood) in Malaysia is sectional: a pro-Malay rewriting of history books in 1999 brought angry protests from the DAP. Richard Mead (cited in Pennycook, 1994) even suggests that Malaysia’s national language policy is designed to encourage the Malays to make use of English while turning the non-Malays away from it. As Benedict Anderson puts it, ‘the concept of a national language is central, but without the practice of a national culture . . . the language is inert’ (B. Anderson, 1990: 47).

Does an independent nation need an independent language?

Since linguists themselves take a wide range of positions on the Whorff-Sapir thesis that language determines thought, and since language planning is not primarily a linguistic exercise anyway, it is not surprising that there is a vigorous and varied debate in former colonies about the possibility of developing an independent society and culture while retaining a colonial language. Myers-Scotton (1993) asserts that language shift is based on political and economic considerations, not emotional ones. Mazrui and Mazrui (1998) concur, maintaining that
Africans are more rational than sentimental in making their language choices. In this they contrast Kenyans with Malaysians (Mazrui & Mazrui, 1996), but Asmah (1996) argues that pragmatism continues to remind Malaysians of their need for and right to English, even as they develop their national language. West African writer Chinua Achebe is an exponent of Kachru’s ‘world Englishes’, writing in a language he feels is culturally his own and arguing that acceptance of the way the world transforms their language is the price the original Anglophone cultures have to pay for its becoming the global tongue (Harrison & Marbach, 1994).

On the other side are those who believe a colonial language is a cultural, economic, and even a cognitive straitjacket. In 1974, Kenyatta declared that the basis of any independent government is a national language (Laitin, 1992). Memmi (1957) thought that colonial (if not other) bilingualism meant psychological wavering between two conflicting realms. Parakrama (1995) feels this continues in ex-colonial countries through the dilemma of seeking powerful Western cultural tools while thereby risking being socialised into a community which reproduces the structures of knowledge and power that oppress them. Rahman (1998) feels that it is Anglophone interests within Pakistan itself that guarantee a weak society in which the masses are alienated from the elite. Tollefson (1991) disputes that there are free and rational choices in language anyway, arguing that these are limited by the historical society a person is born into, and adding that whether or not there is something inherently determining about language, humans make it so. Phillipson (2000: 272) maintains that calling English a neutral lingua franca hides ‘the inequalities inherent in a system that is supposed to serve native speakers and non-native speakers equally well but which manifestly serves some better than others’. Bokamba and Tlou (1997) also dispute claims of neutrality when official English can be found even in almost monolingual societies like Botswana and Swaziland.

At the far ends of this debate there doesn’t seem to be room for compromise. However there are many medial and hedged positions. Mazrui and Mazrui (1998) accept that languages strongly influence the culture of those who use them, but feel the constraint is weaker with a second language, which is more relevant to language planning in most African societies. Malaysian writers and dramatists have been criticised as ‘sectional’ for working in languages other than Malay, yet there is more tolerance of English than of Chinese literature (Pennycook, 1994). Shirley Lim recalls her frustration at being made as a child to search out Wordsworth’s daffodils in tropical Malaysia, yet acknowledges his influence on her own poetry (Pennycook, 1994). Indeed English theatre is more vigorous than Malay there, despite government funding for the latter (Zahim, 2001: personal communication), with some playwrights insisting English is one of the Malaysia’s authentic cultural media. On the other hand, Kiswahili theatre is probably more vibrant than English in Kenya, even though the expatriate dominated National Theatre of the 1950s so derided by Ngugi (1997) is a world away from the grass-roots didacticism of modern English-language groups. Pennycook (1994) concludes that the relationship between English and Western capitalist values is neither determinative nor coincidental in itself, but may be either depending upon the specific historical and social context in which the language is being used.
Are Islam and English compatible?

There is a strong association between Islam and the national languages of Pakistan, Malaysia and Kenya. Urdu evolved in post-Mughal India into a symbol of Muslim identity and was consciously distanced from Hindi. In Malaysia to have Malay as a first language is virtually synonymous with being Muslim, and there are legal restrictions on changing religion or marrying outside it. In Kenya only one in 18 are Muslim, but Kiswahili has close connections with Islam, not least because it is the religion of most of those who speak it as a first language, for whom the influence of those returning from jobs in the Middle East has spawned a certain amount of revivalism. English, on the other hand, has often been seen as a vehicle of non-Islamic Christian, secular or capitalist values. There are Mughal records commenting critically on British agnosticism (Khan, 1998), while when British colonialism was at its height, Islam provided an inspirational alternative to its organisational worldview (Cook, 1996). Most of the former British colonies choosing not to join the Commonwealth were Islamic (Mazrui & Mazrui, 1998). Most nations which have contained (Iran) or even reversed (Sudan) the spread of English are Islamic. A survey of students at Malaysia’s International Islamic University found that all of them were worried about English – which is the main language of instruction there – carrying ideas incompatible with Islam (Ozog, 1990). Fassassi (1995) argues that there will never be African development which works for Africans until there is a rupture with western values, and Islam is ideally suited to replace them.

For the West’s part, Said (1978) claims the Islamic realm was traditionally a source of both fascination and fear since it lay so near to Europe yet remained so unfamiliar. As in other matters, however, the British seem to have taken a fairly pragmatic view of Islam in accordance with local conditions. In Malaya they honoured an agreement in areas nominally under sultanate rule not to allow Christian proselytisation (Asmah, 1996), effectively reinforcing their policy of keeping English from the Malays. In Kenya they needed the pioneering missionaries more, and had less respect for local animist beliefs anyway. They favoured the more Arabised Ki-Unguja of Zanzibar over the Kiswahili varieties of Lamu and Mombassa (Mazrui & Mazrui, 1998), apparently for political and economic reasons. In any case Mazrui and Mazrui argue that Kiswahili was an economic vehicle before it was a religious one. Coulmas (1992) thinks the early association of Kiswahili with Islam may have hindered its expansion. Some Swahilis even today are dismayed to find Christian Africans still dismissing them as backward and even ‘non-African’ because of their religion (de Vere Allen, 1993).

If Kiswahili can be disassociated from Islam, why not English from Western values? Many educated Pakistanis have an ambivalent relationship with the United States, being increasingly eager to study and emigrate there yet retaining some cultural hostility (Malik, 1999). For Malays, Asmah (1979) has distinguished the main functions of Malay, English and Arabic as regional, material and spiritual development respectively, thus raising the possibility of a neutral concept of development and a neutral English. Said (1993) has described the technical, culturally stripped registers of English being taught in the Gulf, whereas Pennycook (1994) comments on frustration among Malaysians with the instructional English they are confined to in their factory-floor jobs. On the other
hand, Asmah (1996) has also argued that a good reason for Muslims to know English is to have access to a vast amount of literature on Islam. Mazrui and Mazrui (1998) remind us that while English has been a language of oppression wielded by the colonialists, it has also been one of liberation exploited by nationalists, while Laitin observes that although Islam was a rallying point against colonialism, it has often left Muslims isolated and disempowered since independence (cited in Pennycook, 1994).

Is English necessary for economic development?

It has been argued in previous sections that globalisation owes more to postcolonial American-dominated business than to British colonialism. Whatever cultural misgivings there may be, the economic possibilities which English appears to hold are often irresistible. For example, although Malaysia’s national language policy has expanded the Malay-speaking sections of the economy, the expansion of the national economy in response to world business produces more jobs for which English is necessary (Chitravelu, 1985). Yet here too there is considerable debate about whether English is necessary or even desirable.

One discourse focuses on the rationality of multilingualism. Dua (1990) concludes that it is difficult to show any correlation between linguistic diversity and slow development. Laitin (1992) feels that there is one, but it explains less than 25% of the variables related to development. For Coulmas (1992), the main problem is showing the direction of causality in any such correlation. In other words, did developed countries become wealthy through linguistic rationalisation, or was it economic development that killed off multilingualism in most of them? Coulmas also gives some examples of English education working against national economic interests, such as brain drains (an increasing problem for Pakistan but possibly being checked in India as high-tech activity is repatriated). On the other hand he concedes that maintaining the domains of a contracting language may exact a high price in terms of corpus planning and cultural exports. It is one that richer countries like France are prepared to pay, as evinced by Mitterand’s 1989 deal to forgive West African debts in return for continued Francophone policies. Honey (1997) thinks investment in ‘undeveloped’ languages is too costly for developing countries, however, and recommends English instead. Bokamba and Tlou (1997) find that although there might be some short-term advantages for elites in opting to invest in a global language, the link with long-term material progress is unfounded.

Going further, some argue that English linguicism directly serves to marginalise and weaken economically peripheral countries. Bruthiaux (2000) suspects that development plans come with Eurocentric baggage put there by history rather than economics. Indeed Malaysia’s prime minister has linked Japan’s recent economic difficulties to its having become too Westernised (Financial Times, 2001). The fact remains that popular demand for English is growing in most postcolonial societies, and governmental elites who fail to respond lay themselves open to suspicion.

If one difficulty running through the discourses on language development is the questionability of the evidence – Lapance has distanced himself from his earlier attempts (e.g. Lapance, 1984) to measure the power of language by adding up the GNPs of the countries where it is a first language – another controversial
aspect is the appropriateness of the economic metaphors used. Fardon and Furniss (1994) note how Africa’s multilingualism is sometimes seen in the West as a problem of ‘oversupply’. Coulmas (1992) cites Gellner’s attributing of linguistic rationalisation to capitalism’s need for a ‘single conceptual currency’, and adds that with the exception of Spanish the world’s strongest languages correspond to the IMF’s reserve currencies. British colonialism always subordinated language and culture to economics but it never effected conversion of one into the other. Grin and Vaillancourt (2000) have offered models whereby users of majority languages might compensate minority communities for the extra resources needed to maintain their language, but they admit this cannot be supported on the basis of equitable distribution of resources. Instead they argue that multilingualism and polyculturalism are environmental assets users and non-users alike may deem worth paying for, thus conceding that languages cannot be treated like other economic commodities.

Closing Remarks: British Colonialism and English Imperialism

In conclusion I want to consider two questions: What were the characteristic dynamics of British colonial language policy? and, To what extent have these impelled the globalisation of the English language?

In 1882 Constantin Franz described Britain as eine künstliche Weltmacht (an artificial global power) because its empire did not have territorial integrity (Reynolds, 1991). Said (1993) has emphasised that the empire was a variegated contest of interests in which there was even room to accommodate anti-imperialist ideas. And Berman and Lonsdale (1992: 72) remind us that the British colonial state was ‘only the partly intended outcome of the often contested interaction of numerous impersonal structural forces and subjective agents, both metropolitan and local’. On the other hand Said (1993) claims there was something systematic about the whole imperial enterprise, and he has contrasted Britain’s material rule over actual conjunctions of people and territory with French imperialism, which lay more in the realm of ideas (Said, 1978).

In looking for this system without a system, this quality of immense but flexible power, we have to conclude that the common core value was commerce. We can infer the primacy of the profit motive from the great majority of colonial operations, without going as far as Windshuttle (1998) in claiming that the lessons of Rome taught the British to mistrust military glory. It is no coincidence that the ‘second empire’ started with the wheeling and dealing of a private company. Even when the management was taken over by government, administration was more by way of running a business than shaping a society. The Treasury kept a tight grip on the money supply, and private financial backers shunned administrative projects without obvious and fairly short-term returns. Lord Grey (quoted in Cain & Hopkins, 1993: 205) announced in 1853 that ‘the surest test for the soundness of measures for the improvement of an uncivilised people is that they should be self-sufficing’.

It might be argued that all modern colonialism had commercial objectives. Nevertheless it seems to have been more essential to the British version, which was much less centralised and bureaucratic than the dirigiste tradition of France or the industrial-driven social imperialism of Germany. Belgium’s occupation of
the Congo started officially as personal aggrandisement for Leopold II (Cook, 1996), while French, and especially Italian imperialism frequently put national prestige before economics. Both commercial exploitation and military objectives were more central to Japanese imperialism, but there was also a conscious and over-ambitious belief in assimilation. Businessmen often led the United States’ acquisition of overseas territories, but the unprecedented expansion of free (and English) education in the Philippines (two million in school in the 1930s, according to Godemont, 1997) suggests a much greater sense of social mission than was normally found with the British.

By keeping the primacy of financial capitalism in mind we can make some sense of many of the policies influencing language in the colonies. Forced, or feeling obliged, to be frugal, colonial administrators looked for collaborators. Valuing Indo-Pakistan’s classical languages seemed likely to conciliate the elites, while emphasising the vernaculars was more calculated to control the masses (Rahman, 1998). The tendency was usually to restrict English rather than promote it, but since there were always people eager to learn in pursuit of employment or business advantage, the priority was to make use of bilinguals without letting Anglicisation get out of hand. ‘Somewhere between German policies of cultural distance and French policies of cultural assimilation lay the unique British variation’ (Mazrui & Mazrui, 1998: 142). There does not seem to have been the paranoid possessiveness about the colonial language that marked the rulers of the East Indies, where just a few hundred out of 26 million Javanese could speak Dutch and where bilingual officials were instructed to speak to their subordinates only in Malay (see Kartini’s letters in Cote, 1995).

As colonial business grew, the need for co-operative English-speaking elites was gradually accepted, and indeed an Anglicised Malay elite had to be actively cultivated from the early twentieth century onward, since employing Chinese risked social disruption. While controlling the flow of English, the administrative and commercial value of local linguae francae was appreciated. Except in the registers of higher education and administration, British colonialism was generally supportive of the languages which now have national status in Pakistan, Malaysia and Kenya.

As a business first and foremost, the colonies were ideally to be run with minimal interference in civil society. Doctrines of trusteeship and dual government were not necessarily disingenuous: the social and intellectual traditions outlined earlier in the paper lent them support. Mazrui and Mazrui assert that ‘the British respected African cultures and languages to a greater extent than did either the Germans or the French’ (Mazrui & Matzui, 1998: 142). Indirect government was also valued politically since the support of local elites – even those which had been refashioned to suit British interests – acted as a buffer against hostility to colonial intrusion and economic disruption. Traditionalism was moreover a convenient way of postponing political changes which might have interfered with business. Britain was reluctant to promote democracy in Kenya until shortly before independence (Haugerud, 1995), by which time a local and largely pro-British authoritarianism had evolved. It is telling that Hong Kong, Britain’s last colony of significance, was an economic powerhouse in which English-speaking oligarchs orchestrated free enterprise for the disenfranchised, un-Anglicised but increasingly prosperous masses. Thus intellectual, strategic
and political factors reinforced trusteeship. But financial solvency was its point of departure.

Promoting Christian missionaries did not seem a good idea early on in India or in the Malay sultanates, but they were increasingly co-opted for knowledge of local languages and culture where this was less likely to cause social disruption, as in the Straits Settlements and coastal India, and this also strengthened a preference for vernacular education at lower levels. In Kenya there was less entrenched local hierarchy and less Western business penetration to latch on to, and less regard for the traditions and beliefs of the interior, so missionary work was integrated into the colonial enterprise from the start. Evidence from the Dutch and Germans suggests that Protestant proselytisers had a general predilection for the vernaculars, which is not surprising given the anti-Latin impetus of the Reformation. In contrast, Jesuits in the pre-American Philippines tended to prefer Spanish, while French and Portuguese priests in Africa competed with each other to teach in their respective languages (Laitin, 1992). The Portuguese outlawed vernacular instruction in Angola in 1921, and by 1950 all schools there were Portuguese-medium. Maloba (1995) comments wryly that after 500 years of imperialism only 1% of the people in Portuguese West Africa could speak the language. Yet this is the language which has been adopted for national unity by FRELIMO in Mozambique, and more recently, in newly independent East Timor.

One more feature of British colonialism – resistance to assimilation into British culture and separate educational and cultural development for different ethnic groups – may also be seen as serving gentlemanly capitalism. For one thing, it offered the possibility of economic innovation without costly, politically dangerous, and intellectually unacceptable social evolution. Malaya is the most transparent example of this, where the Malays were to be left in rural, religious contentment while Chinese worked the tin mines and Tamils the plantations. The ethnic composition of many other former colonies evinces a tendency to import groups with a proven record in a particular enterprise (railway-building, tea-production) rather than risk financial and social investment in untrained locals. This was a departmental style of rule. If there was a strong cultural disposition against ethnic mobility – Lugard felt that English education led to ‘utter disrespect for British and native ideals alike’ (Mazrui & Mazrui, 1998: 1) – it was supported by fear of social and economic disorder. When Curzon and Windstedt resisted Anglicising the masses because they would then start wanting better jobs, it reflected an intimate understanding of their colonies’ economic capacities.

Even the exceptions tend to prove the rule that the business of empire was business. Anglicism in India led to a small English-reading middle class sitting above those possessing the rudiments of a vernacular education, which Pennycook (1994) feels was the ideal social structure for late 19th-century British economic objectives. In the 1930s, 1940s, and above all 1950s, centralised funds were somehow made available for education and propaganda, but the rationale was that Britain had to invest in the colonies in order to preserve its own global economic status. For similar reasons, Britain went further than the French in training a new postcolonial bureaucracy to take over (Kirk-Greene, 1999). Even though in the 1930s empire had been far more important to the British economy
than the French (Reynolds, 1991), its demise brought nothing approaching the collapse of the Quatrième République. No British government was brought down by decolonisation: the financial elites had already moved on to seek their profits elsewhere.

Putting business at the centre of empire may also help to inform analyses of the complex, multicausal phenomenon of post-imperial globalisation of English. The split between the status and use of English argued for earlier in the paper on former colonies implies that elitism and restrictionism are still prevalent. It may be that this suits the brand of global capitalism that has emerged since the Second World War, and there is certainly a case for arguing that linguistic inequality within developing nations serves core capitalism just as much as inequality between the peripheral and core nations does. It is not so easy, however, to argue for a linguist conspiracy in which private and state agents of ELT conspire to restrict English – although the signal failure of English programmes in much of the world (Hall, 2000) makes it tempting to do so. Although Conrad (1996) notes how English is still spoken by less than 4% in India, if anything it seems that the forces of neocolonialism try to spread English (Phillipson, 2000), even if they are misguided or relatively unsuccessful in doing so.

On the other hand, the case for language-backed capitalist rationalisation seems stronger. Grin (1999) writes of a snowball effect in which people are increasingly interested in English just because so many others are interested in it. Mazrui and Mazrui (1998) have argued that English has a more insidious hold on Kenya than on Tanzania because the former is more closely tied to Western capitalism. Resistant societies are often anticapitalistic, such as (at least in rhetoric) Myanmar. But if there is a capitalist-driven language spread it seems to emanate less from continuation of the empire by other means and more from the financial order which replaced the *Pax Britannica* and which Britain itself was compelled to go along with. Even Malaysia’s leader, who once promoted a ‘buy British last’ campaign and now argues for the existence of a financial colonialis conspiracy, supports measures to increase the use of English in higher education (Asmah, 1996).

Fishman (1996a) feels that serving global capitalism is not synonymous with serving American and British interests, although these may often be congruent. The economic growth of European nations which followed the collapse of their empires also suggests that neocolonialism is something different from a continuation of traditional imperial structures under a postcolonial political veneer. Another factor casting doubt on the correlation between British colonialism and English linguistic is the faster growth of the language in areas which were not in the empire, such as the Far East and Europe. In addition, the extent of English globalisation itself is called into question by the tenacity of other colonial languages. French continues to dominate most of former French Africa (Maloba, 1995) and Spanish is not under threat in South America. Dutch may have almost disappeared from Indonesia but it is still the official language of Suriname.

Of the three polities focused on in this paper, perhaps Malaysia best reveals the complexity of the equation between traditional colonialism and modern capitalism. It shows a more successful institutionalisation of the national language in education and government than is the case in the other two polities, and at the same time possesses a much more expansive business sector which is likely at
least to maintain English use at current levels (Chitravelu, 1985). As under colo-
nialism, linguistic separation of business and sociopolitical culture remains plau-
sible, although when there is competition between them there is now less doubt
as to which takes priority.

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Notes
1. For consistency I refer to the three polities in this order since it follows the chronology
of decolonisation and to some extent reflects the sequence of British penetration. I am
very grateful to the series editors for entrusting me to say something about this fasci-
nating topic.
2. Technically the empire is still going inasmuch as over a dozen dependent territories
remain: Anguilla; Bermuda; British Antarctic Territory; British Indian Ocean Terri-
tory (whose populations were resettled between 1967 and 1973 to facilitate military
use); British Virgin Islands; Cayman Islands; Falkland Islands; South Georgia; South
Sandwich Islands; Gibraltar; Montserrat; Pitcairn Islands; St Helena and Depend-
cencies; and the Turks and Caicos.
3. In this paper, colonialism refers to policies based on long-term control of overseas territo-
ries and also to the ideology which made this control natural and acceptable to the
colonisers. Imperialism is used similarly but with the added implication of a conscious
sense of coordinated metropolitan control over diverse territories for some common
purpose. I also regard the latter term as having emotional connotations of
aggrandisement beyond the mere search for financial advantage. I don’t necessarily
infer the close association between imperialism and industrial expansion that is
central to classical Marxist definitions, but I do assume, as in Said (1978), that its
cultural components depended on material control. Neocolonialism I take to be the
exertion of economic and cultural domination in the absence of formal political
control, above all in territories where such control once existed. Decolonisation is
particularly open to wide interpretation. I have taken on board Hargreave’s (1999)
‘measures intended eventually to terminate formal political control . . . and to replace
it by some new relationship’ while noting Leopold Senghor’s 1957 insistence (cited in
Hargreaves, 1996: 2) that it is contingent upon a mental change on the part of both
coloniser and colonised.
4. As a former British colony itself the United States might be considered an aspect of
British imperialism, but this paper’s main focus is on the ‘second empire’ developed
after the Americans and British were going their separate ways and particularly on
territories which were controlled for commercial exploitation without large-scale Brit-
ish settlement and which did not gain home rule until after the Second World War. For
this reason ‘white dominions’ such as Australia and New Zealand have also been
excluded.
5. I have followed Kaplan and Baldauf’s (1997: 3) guidelines for language planning as
‘deliberate, although not always overt’ attempts to modify linguistic behaviour, with
language policy as the ideas and regulations which evolve during a period of planning.
6. The tendency among writers to focus on the smooth handover of power from the British
to the Malay elite may be justified as an explanation for the continued influence of
the British (e.g. Said, 1993) but it overlooks the experience of those sections of the
Chinese community on the receiving end of British and Malaysian military action
against communist insurgency.
7. In the words of Thomas Babington Macaulay, later to become a significant voice in the
debate over language in colonial India, who urged judicious reform as a measure to

8. Reynolds (1991) also notes the small number of European civil servants in India – just 1300 in 1900 – but he asserts that the British army, while quite irrelevant to the balance of power in late 19th-century Europe, was more than sufficient to handle peripheral threats around the empire.

9. Arguing that the prevailing cultural ideas of the day influenced the colonial class would need more demonstrative examples in a piece focusing on this particular aspect of social history. In a more general paper such as this I hope it is enough to summarise the leading ideas without exploring causal links. But I would emphasise that there is a chain of academic support for broader hypothetical inferencing, stretching from C.S. Pierce through Quentin Skinner’s reconstructive history at Cambridge to Frankenberg and Robinson’s ‘abductive’ social anthropology at Brunel, which seeks relationships between social phenomena without being constrained by explicit epistemological categories.

10. Discussions with Rachel Lea, who did her doctoral research at Brunel University, have greatly helped me formulate these general views on the intellectual role of British social anthropology.

11. For example, a tendency to think in terms of ‘us vs. the rest’ has dominated modern Japanese social theories, such as Nakane Chie’s Japanese Society (1970), which underplays tensions within the process of Japanese industrialisation by arguing that native vertically structured social norms unavailable to the rest of the industrialised world enabled avoidance of class-based antagonism.

12. To borrow Benedict Anderson’s concept of post-Renaissance European nationalism rooted in print-capitalism.

13. Put simply, the formula is for multilingual polities where both a national and a regional or international language are widely used. For those whose L1 is the national one, language, two (i.e. 3 – 2) may be enough; people with a different first language will need three in order to compete with them; and those whose home language is neither the national one nor that of the majority in the local area may need to have (3+1) four languages in their repertoire.

14. For example, MacArthur notes that English has had de jure status in Lousiana since 1912 and in California since 1986.

15. Choy’s (1986) comments suggest that English is the second language politically in Malaysia even though it may not fulfil accepted linguistic criteria for individuals such as medium of instruction or lingua franca.

16. In discussions over the desirability of teaching only through the medium of the target language (e.g. SPELT, 2000: 10) distinctions are frequently drawn between areas, even teaching environments, within the same country, where English is a second language and those where it is perceived as a foreign language.

17. From 2003 the Malaysian government has reintroduced English as the medium of instruction for science and mathematics in schools.

References


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